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Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC's
Role in Regulating Information
ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIANt
INTRODUCTION
Information is said to be the lifeblood of financial
markets.' Securities markets rely on corporate disclosures,
quotes, prices, and indices, as well as the market
structures, products, and standards that give them context
and meaning, for the efficient allocation of capital in the
global economy. The availability of and access to such
information on reasonable terms has been identified as one
t Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I would like to thank Roberta
Karmel, Steve Williams, and Elizabeth King for their comments on prior drafts
of this Article and Lloyd Bonfield, David Snyder, Jonathan Nash, and
Christopher Cotropia for their helpful insights. Special thanks are due to the
faculty and staff of the Georgetown University Law Center for the hospitality
shown to my colleagues and me during the evacuation of New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina. I am also grateful to Christopher Kyle Johnston and
Samuel Vigil for their research assistance and Toni Mochetta for her assistance
in preparing this Article for publication. All errors are mine.
1. Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, SEC, Quality Information: The
Lifeblood of Our Markets (Oct. 18, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm; Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC,
Improving Financial Disclosure for Individual Investors (May 3, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042506cc.htm ("When it
comes to giving investors the protection they need, information is the single
most powerful tool we have. It's what separates investing from roulette.").
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of the essential characteristics of strong financial markets. 2
And yet because information is a commodity, 3 policymakers
must balance the desirability of providing public access to
such goods against the need to maintain appropriate
incentives for information producers. 4
In U.S. securities markets, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission) faces the primary
challenge of regulating the balance between the commercial
and social value of information. In some areas, the
Commission has all but extinguished private rights, while
in other areas, it has disavowed any authority to tread upon
private rights in deference to federal or state intellectual
property doctrines. In yet other areas, the SEC has created
intricate entitlements tailored to historical market
structures. Against this backdrop, self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), securities intermediaries, and other
entities have staked out proprietary claims to position
themselves competitively in the ongoing transformation of
the securities marketplace.
As we move away from the paradigm of the dominant
national exchange to the reality of competing national and
global trading venues, it is increasingly urgent that the
Commission articulate an intellectual property policy.5 The
2. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001).
3. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 1:8, at 1-12 to -13 (2005)
(defining the elements of information as the "communication or receipt" of raw
data, linked to an "interpretation or understanding" that renders the data
meaningful); see also generally Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus,
Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (1992) (discussing the framework for modern commerce
and regulation of information law).
4. See generally Market Data: Implications to Investors, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony by producers and consumers of
market information on the appropriateness of granting proprietary rights in
market information).
5. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315 (1985)
(predicting the rise of market-based information and reporting systems as
exchanges lose market dominance); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara,
From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 563 (2005) (describing the paradigm shift in terms of transaction and
agency costs).
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demutualization of the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) and
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),6 the completed and
impending mergers of numerous national and international
exchanges and market centers, and the prevalence of
securities listed simultaneously on U.S. and non-U.S.
exchanges 7 (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act notwithstanding) are
likely to generate numerous disputes over the allocation of
rights and interests in securities information.8  Some
articulated statement of policy would appear necessary to
govern the Commission's regulation of rights in
information, particularly given the incremental nature of
the regulatory process and the delegation of authority
within the Commission to its operating divisions.
This Article undertakes a comprehensive comparative
analysis of the SEC's agencywide initiatives as regulator of
information and other intellectual property rights. The
Article considers the Commission's regulatory objectives-
both with respect to the public availability of information
and larger macrostructural objectives-as well as the
means by which it has sought to achieve these objectives. In
doing so, I draw upon general theories of intellectual
property to illustrate traditional approaches to balancing
private and public claims to information, as applied to the
discrete situations in which the Commission has invoked, or
refrained from invoking, its regulatory authority to advance
the purposes of the federal securities laws. The Article
ultimately suggests that the Commission adopt a consistent
policy with respect to information and intellectual property
regulation and seek to achieve its various regulatory
objectives through means that affirm the baseline rights of
information creators.
6. See Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business
as Usual?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657, 668 (2001); see also Andreas M.
Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2562
(2006); Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications
of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 368
(2002); Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream
(That Should Be) Deferred, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1190-94 (2005).
7. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact of
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate
Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
8. See Reena Aggarwal & Sandeep Dahiya, Demutualization and Public
Offerings of Financial Exchanges, 18 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 96, 96-100 (2005);
Fleckner, supra note 6, at 2571-2618.
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Part I of this Article surveys the key types of
information or intellectual property that have been
implicated in securities litigation and regulatory action.
Part II assesses the underlying justifications advanced by
the SEC and others for acknowledging or subordinating
such intellectual property interests in financial markets.
Part III considers the various strategies used by the
Commission and comparable regulators to manage
intellectual property rights and their application to
financial market regulation. Part IV synthesizes a set of
principles to guide the SEC's regulatory agenda and
illustrates how those principles might be implemented in
various spheres of regulation.
I. A TAXONOMY OF INFORMATION RIGHTS IN SECURITIES
MARKETS
Scholars have long debated the level of protection that
should be given to intellectual property (including
information) that falls outside the traditional paradigms of
patent and copyright law.9 Since the seminal case of
International News Service v. Associated Press0
prominently posed the question whether such types of
information should be entitled to limited protection,
academics, legislators, and regulators have struggled with
determining the bases for granting such rights and their
appropriate scope.
At the heart of the debate is the perceived need to
balance private incentives to produce information against
the social benefit of making it broadly accessible." Property
rights are generally thought to promote the efficient
allocation of private resources to the creation of socially
beneficial goods by allowing creators to internalize their
benefits-specifically, through the right to exclude others
9. For a survey of hybrid intellectual property regimes, see J. H. Reichman,
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2432 (1994).
10. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
11. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 11-36 (2003) (critiquing the
"incentive-access" paradigm of traditional intellectual property scholarship);
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996).
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from (or charge others for) access and use. 12 As exclusionary
rights, however, they result in deadweight social losses
when rightholders reject welfare-enhancing transactions or
are unable efficiently to contract with all potential users
due to high transaction costs. 13 Critics of property regimes
therefore focus on the unbridled right of exclusion,
particularly for goods without ready substitutes. 14
Notably, many information goods and intellectual
property rights are classified as "public goods"-goods
which possess the characteristics of non-excludability and
nonrival usage. 15 Special property regimes have been
thought necessary to promote these goals when traditional
intellectual property paradigms fail,' 6 which in many cases
12. See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 9 (1988); P. K.
RAO, THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTION COSTS 49-50 (2003) (discussing the role of
property rights in dealing with economic externalities); see also Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-50
(1967); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The
Competition between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUDS. 653,
655-57 (2002); J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M. Netter & James A. Overdahl,
Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from a
Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON. 591, 626 (1997).
13. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery
of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 180-83 (2004). As Professors
Kieff and Paredes note, an intellectual property owner's ability to price
discriminate among potential users may reduce the deadweight loss, though
scholars debate whether such price discrimination strategies may on occasion
yield greater losses than an outright prohibition against price discrimination.
Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 293 (1970)).
14. See, e.g., James A. Rahl, The Right to 'Appropriate" Trade Values, 23
OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 73 (1962) (arguing for limited protection of trade secrets and
other proprietary information); Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine
as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875, 897
(1991) (finding that a policy of broad property rights in intellectual property
may yield "socially undesirable excesses").
More generally, "property" rules may be contrasted with "liability" rules, as
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed have observed, which permit a
prospective purchaser to pay the holder of an "entitlement" an objectively
determined amount of damages, rather than forcing the purchaser to negotiate
terms with the holder. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV.
1089, 1089-93 (1972).
15. RAO, supra note 12, at 43.
16. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information
Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633 (1998).
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unbundle the rights typically associated with intellectual
property-such as the right to copy, to use, to disclose, to
modify, alter, or destroy, to transmit, or to access. 17
For the purposes of this Article, I will focus on five
specific types of information: (1) material information
generated by public companies about their business and
operations ("company information"); (2) quotations, transaction
reports, and other forms of market information generated
by exchanges and other market centers ("market
information"); (3) indices and other formulae that underlie
derivative products; (4) financial contract and product
design; and (5) rules and standards for the preparation and
dissemination of the foregoing.
A. Company Information
Despite the long history of public company disclosures
under federal securities law, company disclosures can be
thought of as a regulated information commodity. For
example, state law has recognized a proprietary interest in
information that firms generate about their business
methods and operations. Such protection has traditionally
been conferred under the rubric of state "trade secret" law,
in which a firm may seek to prevent misappropriation of
information obtained "in breach of a confidential
relationship or intrusion into a protected environment."1 8
The value of such information, to the extent it may be
quantified, is the competitive advantage obtained by
keeping it confidential. In the case of unpatented
technologies, for example, the value of confidential
information to the firm might be the premium the firm
would reap from the sale of a particular good or service over
a competitively set price if others were able to replicate it.' 9
17. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 29 (1987); NIMMER, supra note 3, § 1:8, at 1-12 to -13.
18. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2:39, at 2-127 to -128; see also SEC v. Talbot,
430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006); SEC v. Kornman, 391 F. Supp. 2d 477
(N.D. Tex. 2005).
19. See, e.g., Sunds Defibrator AB v. Beloit Corp., 930 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1991) (basing damages on what a third-party purchaser would have paid the
firm had its competitor not submitted a rival bid on the basis of technical
information obtained in breach of a licensing agreement). To survive
preemption under the federal Copyright Act, trade secret law imposes liability
[Vol. 55
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The traditional justification for denying trade secret or
other intellectual property protection to more abstract firm
information is the inability to quantify its value or cost.20
More practically, firms competing for capital investment
must keep current and potential investors apprised of
material information, if only to avoid adverse inferences
vis-A-vis their more communicative competitors. 21 For
example, prior to the adoption of the federal securities laws,
exchanges developed public disclosure requirements for
listed companies as a way to standardize disclosure and
ensure accurate valuation of listed securities. 22 In enacting
the federal securities laws, Congress extended the idea of
mandatory minimum disclosures inherent in such private
ordering to include disclosures in connection with public
offerings of securities, 23 and periodic disclosures for issuers
of exchange-listed securities, and since 1964, for issuers of
only when there is a breach of a fiduciary relationship or other relationship of
trust and confidence, such as a confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement. See
infra notes 41-45. As such, liability requires "reasonable precautions" to keep
information secret and "actual or constructive notice" of the alleged wrongful
infringement. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2:39 at 2-127; see also, e.g., Rockwell
Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
20. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Donald Langevoort, Information
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1985). It has been suggested, for example, that federal mandatory disclosure
requirements rarely compel disclosure of truly "sensitive" information. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (2006); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1102 (1995).
21. See Mahoney, supra note 20; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 286-92 (1991). Game-
theorists describe the voluntary disclosure of such information, at least when
easily verifiable, as the "unraveling result." E.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H.
GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 89-90 (1994).
22. Exchanges, in an effort to deter Congress from enacting securities laws,
had increased their disclosure requirements throughout the turn of the century.
See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 75-76 (3d ed. 2003).
Moreover, because purchases or sales of securities on credit were routinely
collateralized by equity securities, exchanges had an interest in ensuring that
such collateral was appropriately valued; the variety of state corporation codes
and the Exchange's reluctance to regulate financial disclosures limited the
extent to which the New York Stock Exchange and others succeeded in such
efforts. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 32-
41 (1970).
23. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77j (2000).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
publicly traded over-the-counter securities meeting certain
size and shareholder requirements. 24 Over time, the SEC
has used its statutory mandate to require not only the
preparation of more "forward-looking" information and
analysis, but also the preparation of additional "accuracy-
enhancing" information and implementation of related
internal controls. 25
In addition to regulating what must be disclosed, the
Commission has also sought to promote a "level"
informational playing field for all investors. Accordingly,
the Commission has sought to leverage its statutory
authority over mandatory disclosures to prohibit selective
disclosures of material non-public information,26 and its
antifraud authority to deter trading on the basis of material
non-public information.2 7 The Commission has recognized
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78o(d) (2000). The
express disclosures mandated by Congress in connection with public offerings
under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, replicated the
disclosure requirements of the NYSE, which were based on the English
Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (Eng.). See also Mahoney, supra
note 20, at 1073-74.
25. See Mahoney, supra note 20, at 1078. These might include
management's discussion and analysis of operations, GAAP-compliant financial
statements and attendant auditors' reports, and the implementation and
periodic review of internal controls to assure the completeness and integrity of
such disclosures. See id. at 1106 (distinguishing the economic case for disclosure
of information in management's possession to address agency costs and the
economic case for compelling the preparation and production of accuracy-
enhancing information). As discussed further below in Part II.A, such
requirements have prompted many commentators to make the economic
argument that the costs of "mandatory disclosure" may well not be justified by
the expected social benefits. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005);
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 115-34 (2006),
available at httpJ/www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
26. Regulation Fair Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2006).
27. See, e.g., Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006)
(prohibiting trading on the basis of material, non-public information). The
Commission's authority to regulate exogenous information about public issuers
is somewhat more attenuated because of the general requirement of fraud or
deception in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646
(1983); Santa Fe v. Green, 430 U.S. 362 (1977). Thus, persons other than
issuers, such as analysts, may independently collect and selectively sell
information without regard to such restrictions, although proprietary research
information may be entitled to copyright protection, see, e.g., Chad Bray,
Brokerage Firms File Suit Against Theflyonthewall.com, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
June 26, 2006, http://online.wsj.com, and information obtained in breach of a
REG ULA TING INFORMATION
limited exceptions for sharing non-public information with
commercial vendors, such as rating agencies, but only with
the expectation that ratings are published to the
marketplace free of charge.28
Investors must rely more heavily on market-based
approaches to disclosure when mandatory disclosure
requirements do not apply. Securities privately placed with
and traded among qualified institutional buyers under Rule
144A are accompanied by extensive offering disclosures,
which are often compared favorably with mandatory
disclosures for public companies. 29 By contrast, offerings of
securities to retail investors not subject to SEC disclosure
requirements routinely are thought to suffer from
inadequate information, despite the existence of state "Blue
Sky" laws that may impose independent disclosure
requirements on securities offerings or publicly held
securities. 30 Post-offering disclosures for purchasers and
sellers in the secondary market are even more difficult to
obtain. Investors in municipal securities and "pink sheet"
securities not required to be registered under § 12 of the
Exchange Act have, for example, access only to minimal
periodic or transient disclosures under SEC rules, 31 and
relationship of trust or confidence with a person other than an issuer may give
rise to antifraud liability, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006), as may information
obtained regarding a pending tender offer, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2006).
28. But see Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization, Exchange Act Release Nos. 8,570, 51,572, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306
(Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing that rating
agencies be required to publicly disseminate their ratings at no cost to be
designated a "nationally recognized statistical rating organization").
29. See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets,
35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 533, 557-58 (2002); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure
Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 6 (citing Patrick
McGeehan, Money Raised in Private Placement of Issues Doubles as Companies
Take Advantage of SEC's Rule 144A, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at R38).
30. See Petition from Pink Sheets LLC to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, SEC
(Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitionlpetn4-519.pdf; Michael K.
Molitor, Will More Sunlight Fade the Pink Sheets? Increasing Public
Information About Non-Reporting Issuers with Quoted Securities, 39 IND. L.
REV. 309 (2006) (arguing for § 13-like disclosures for pink sheets).
31. Such disclosures, moreover, are required only by virtue of the SEC's
authority over the broker-dealers intermediating transactions in such
securities. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c2-11 to -12 (2006).
2007]
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unlike investors in public companies, 32 must rely on
individual broker-dealers or private information repositories to
obtain such information. 33
B. Market Information
The SEC also regulates data regarding the negotiation
and execution of secondary market transactions in publicly
traded securities. Such "market information" includes pre-
trade indications of trading interest ("quotations") and post-
trade information on individual trades ("trade reports"). It
may also include statistical information on the performance
of individual stocks, commodities, or indices. More recently,
with the advent of new trading systems, the term also fairly
encompasses information regarding the statistical
performance of individual market participants responsible
32. For securities subject to the Exchange Act § 13 mandatory disclosure
system, the Commission provides a free service-EDGAR-for the retrieval of
public company information. While many value-added services exist, they
cannot appropriate value from the exclusive right to distribute company
information. See Free EDGAR: Free Real-Time SEC EDGAR Filings,
http://www.freeedgar.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2007); Global Securities
Information, Inc., http://.www.gsionline.com (last visited Jan 17, 2007).
33. For unregistered securities, only the initial quoting dealer is required to
obtain the information required by Rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11
(2006), from the issuer and to provide such information to investors on request.
The NASD requires a copy of such information to be filed prior to the quoting of
pink sheet securities through its over-the-counter equity service. Nat'l Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual: Rule 6620 (CCH 2006), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&recordid= 115
9007297&elementid=1159000873&highlight=6620#rl159007297. Pink Sheets,
LLC, a privately-owned provider of pricing and financial information for
unregistered securities, has also developed disclosure policies to facilitate the
sharing of periodic disclosures respecting such securities. See Pink Sheets,
Electronic Quotation and Trading System for OTC Securities,
http://www.pinksheets.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).
For municipal securities, Rule 15c2-12, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2006),
generally requires a participating underwriter to: (1) obtain and distribute to
prospective investors an official statement from a municipal issuer containing
information about a municipal securities offering; and (2) ensure that the issuer
has undertaken to provide ongoing financial information and disclosure of
certain material events to each "nationally recognized municipal securities
information repository" (NRMSIR). See Municipal Securities Information
Sources, http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/nrmsir.htm (last visited Jan 19,
2007) (list of NRMSIRs).
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for executing, or making execution decisions regarding,
customer orders. 34
Organized securities and commodity markets have long
exerted significant effort to assert property rights in market
data to prevent "free-riding." Unlike in the context of public
company information, exchange competitors (such as
market makers) may use an exchange's market information
to execute transactions at comparable prices at a lower
charge. Such "cream-skimming" practices are alleged not
only to reduce the volume of transactions (and trading fees)
an exchange would normally receive, but also to impair the
quality of the information an exchange is able to generate
because the exchange does not have the opportunity to
control the interaction of all order flow in the
marketplace. 35
Exchanges have relied on the law of contract and the
tort law concept of misappropriation to protect their
interests, for want of any general federal information
protection regime. Exchanges that disseminate transaction
and quotation information to broker-dealers and professional
investors have historically imposed conditions limiting the
ability of recipients to redisseminate their information.36
Courts have upheld such contracts, finding that exchanges
have "the right . . .to keep the quotations to itself or [to]
communicate them to others. ' 37 By analogy to "trade
secrets," the mere fact that an exchange "communicat[es]
the result [of its trading activity] to persons, even if many,
in confidential relations," does not undermine the argument
34. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.605-.606 (2006).
35. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Comment, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 72, 82 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
Market makers may be willing to share the profits from such cream-skimming
practices with brokers in exchange for their willingness to route order flow. See
David Easley, Nicholas M. Kiefer & Maureen O'Hara, Cream-Skimming or
Profit-Sharing? The Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow, 51 J. FIN. 811
(1996).
36. See, e.g., Mulherin, Netter & Overdahl, supra note 12, at 604-25
(describing key cases in the development of property rights in market
information).
37. Hunt v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322, 338 (1907).
2007]
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that dissemination in breach of such trust is not
actionable. 38
Exchanges have also sought to characterize
unauthorized redissemination or use of their data as a
misappropriation of property or infringement of their price
discovery function. 39 Recent developments, to a certain
degree, have tended to narrow the range of claims that may
be asserted. For example, the Copyright Act of 1976
preempted state law misappropriation claims to the extent
they confer "equivalent right[s]" on works that come within
the subject matter of copyright.40 In Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,41 the U.S. Supreme Court
restricted copyright protection for factual compilations only
to the original aspects of their selection or arrangement of
facts that possess a "minimal creative spark" or "quantum
of creativity," but not to the facts themselves. 42 Several
post-Feist cases confirm that compilations of pricing
information may be protected under copyright law, for
example, when they reflect appraisals or estimates based
upon the application of judgment, rather than raw reports
38. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250
(1905).
39. See, e.g., Market Data: Implications to Investors and Market
Transparency of Granting Ownership Rights over Stock Quotes: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't. Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 74-81 (2001) (testimony of Richard P.
Bernard, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, NYSE).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
41. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
42. Id. at 363. The Court referred to the definition of "compilation" in § 101
of the Copyright Act to identify the three distinct elements necessary for a work
to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: "(1) the collection and assembly of
pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the particular
selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an 'original' work of authorship." Id.
at 357.
Scholars have questioned whether "originality" should be a necessary pre-
condition for federal copyright protection, or why a lack of originality should
result in preemption of state law claims. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1865 (1990) (discussing the elimination of state law protection for compiled
information); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 119 (1991) (discussing originality as one of the central elements of
the copyright doctrine that lacks justification and coherence).
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of completed transactions43-perhaps such as on a
quotation montage or limit order book.
Even if market information is not copyrightable, state
law misappropriation claims for "hot news" may survive
Feist and the Copyright Act's preemption provisions if such
claims possess an "extra element" in addition to the acts of
reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, in order
to constitute a state-created cause of action. As with trade
secret law, such claims must typically incorporate an
element of wrongful conduct. 44 Moreover, in the Copyright
Act of 1976, Congress recognized the continuing vitality of
state law "misappropriation claims" in scientific, business,
and financial databases. 45
The ability of exchanges and other market centers to
restrict the provision of information, however, has been
significantly limited by the Commission's rules under the
national market system. SEC rules ostensibly centralize the
administration of SRO rights in market information with a
43. See CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (wholesale price
guides for collectible coins copyrightable); CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. MacLean
Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) (valuation of used vehicles
copyrightable); Marshall & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (appraisal of residential property in assessor's manual
copyrightable).
44. In Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997),
the Second Circuit defined the elements central to an INS "hot news"
misappropriation claim post-Feist as follows:
(i) a plaintiff generates or collects information at some cost or expense;
(ii) the value of the information is highly time-sensitive;
(iii) the defendant's use of the information constitutes free-riding on
the plaintiffs costly efforts to generate or collect it;
(iv) the defendant's use of the information is in direct competition with
a product or service offered by the plaintiff; and
(v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its
existence or quality would be substantially threatened.
Id. at 845; see also U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d
1028 (3d Cir. 1984); Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058
(N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 (1995).
45. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5748 (asserting that "misappropriation" claims were not preempted for
business, financial, and scientific databases).
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view to ensuring that any associated revenues are applied
to self-regulatory activities. 46 Thus, markets facilitating
trading in covered securities must pool their market maker
and specialist quotations into a "national best bid and offer"
(NBBO), which may then be accessed through the facilities
of an exchange or through interexchange mechanisms. 47
The SEC has also mandated public display,
consolidation in the NBBO, dissemination, and access to
certain priced customer orders held by any "market
center."48 Unlike quotations (which are continuously posted
by specialists and market makers designated by a market
center to create a reasonable expectation of liquidity
therein), customer orders represent voluntary disclosure of
price information by customers to a market center in the
expectation of receiving an execution at such price or better.
Currently, the SEC only requires disclosure of customer
orders held by a market center when they improve the
NBBO, although the SEC has periodically considered
46. Regulation of Market Information Fees and Revenues, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,208, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613 (Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Market
Data Concept Release]. Although the Commission has recognized the right to
charge for the sale of such information, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 242.601(c) (2006),
the Commission has maintained that the proceeds from such "sale" are intended
to subsidize self-regulatory functions. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 70,624-25.
47. The SEC regulates quotation display and access not only to provide
execution opportunities for retail brokers but also to facilitate "derivative
pricing" off of the NBBO. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, at 10,577-81 (Feb. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Market Fragmentation Concept Release]. For example, part of the
Commission's strategy for encouraging the competitiveness of market-makers
and regional exchanges throughout the 1960s and 1970s was to make it easier
for them to compete more effectively with NYSE specialist quotes. See generally
SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 486-534. The opportunity to access such quotations,
even if unexercised, effectively requires competing market makers and
specialists to match the NBBO for retail orders or expose the routing broker to
a violation of its best execution obligation.
48. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.301(b)(3), 242.602 (2006). The term "market center"
includes, in addition to any national securities exchange or SRO, "any exchange
market maker, OTC market maker, and alternative trading system."
Regulation NMS Rule 600(b)(38), 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(38) (2006). Thus,
individual specialists, market makers, alternative trading systems, and
electronic communications systems may be deemed "market centers"
independent of the exchange(s) with which they may be affiliated.
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whether to mandate disclosure of all "depth-of-book"
information. 49
Exchanges and other market centers have accordingly
pursued different strategies to maximize the value of the
property rights within the framework created by SEC rules.
Several SROs rebate fees collected from the sale of market
data to their members to encourage aggressive quotation,
while others have sought to increase the volume of
information generated artificially in an effort to generate
more fee revenue.50 Yet others have sought to create
branded information products that do not fall easily within
the scope of SEC disclosure rules, with a view to marketing
them under the protection of trademark and
misappropriation law. 51 Others have suppressed display of
all trading activity and perform merely crossing functions-
becoming, in effect, "dark liquidity pools"-to avoid
triggering public display requirements. 52 On the political
front, exchanges have also sought protection of broader
categories of market information through database
protection legislation. 53
For debt securities, the SEC has pursued more modest
transparency initiatives, consistent with the greater
illiquidity of such markets and pressure to suppress
49. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 49,325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126,
at 11,136 (Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Regulation NMS Proposing Release].
50. The Commission has recently modified intermarket plan formulae to
favor aggressive quotation and eliminate the benefits under current formulae
from abusive trade reporting practices. See infra note 285.
51. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Dissemination
of Liquidity Quotations, Exchange Act Release No. 47,614, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,140
(Apr. 8, 2003); Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the
Establishment of the Nasdaq Order Display and Collector Facilities, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,020 (Jan. 26, 2001) (approving Nasdaq's
proposed TotalView and PowerView data products); Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change Relating to Fees for NYSE OpenBook, Exchange Act Release No.
45,138, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,491 (Dec. 26, 2001).
52. See Nina Mehta, Who's Afraid of the Dark?, TRADERS MAG. (June 08,
2006), httpJ/www.tradersmagazine.comcolumn.cfm?id=271&year=2006; Junius W.
Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP., FIN. &
COM. L. (forthcoming 2007).
53. See RUBEN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? 147-49 (1998); Amy C. Sullivan,
When the Creative is the Enemy of the True: Database Protection in the U.S. and




disclosure of proprietary trading information. 54 For publicly
traded corporate debt, rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) require reporting of transaction
prices but not quotation information. 55 With respect to
municipal securities, the SEC has relied on cooperative
efforts among the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
and the municipal securities industry to make market
information available to investors. 56
C. Derivatives and Market Indices
The ascendance of options, futures, and other
derivatives on financial instruments over the past three
decades 57 has given rise to two intellectual property issues.
First, since a derivative contract is necessarily "derived"
from another instrument, to what extent must the issuer of
the derivative contract obtain the permission of the "owner"
of rights in the underlying instrument? Second, because the
value of the derivative contract is likewise "derived" directly
or indirectly from the reported value of the underlying
instrument, to what extent must information about the
reported value of the underlying security or securities be
licensed from the primary market or markets? 58
The latter question-licensing of prices in the spot
market for products underlying derivatives-has not raised
54. Cf. Proposal for More Bond Data Is Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006,
at C10 (describing withdrawal of European Commission proposal to require
dissemination of corporate and government debt transaction information).
55. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual: Rule 6230 (CCH 2006),
available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&el
ement id=ll 59000841.
56. See Municipal Bonds: Real-Time Data Dissemination Debuts, Next-Day
Info Now Available in 15 Minutes, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Feb. 1, 2005 (describing
the MSRB & The Bond Market Association's Real-Time Transaction Reporting
System).
57. For a history of stock index futures and other index derivatives, see
JOHN MILLERS, STOCK INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURES 5 (1992).
58. For a cash-settled contract, the actual settlement of the contract will
take place at a closing price derived from the market center(s) trading the
underlying instrument. For a physically-settled contract, settlement will take
place through physical delivery. In the latter case, it may be argued that
market center need not obtain permission to use the closing price of another
exchange insofar as the closing price is irrelevant. In practice, of course, most
contracts are netted out prior to the settlement date.
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significant issues.59 For derivatives settled by "physical
delivery" of the underlying instrument, an exchange listing
a derivative may make no official use of prices disseminated
by a competing market center. For derivatives settled in
cash, the closing price at which settlement takes place may
well be in the public domain under SEC regulations if
market information about the underlying security (such as
an equity security) is required to be disclosed to the public.
Moreover, since trading in derivatives naturally increases
the demand for market information regarding the
underlying instruments, exchanges trading the underlying
equity securities would likely make considerable effort to
provide such data to the derivatives exchange on reasonable
terms.60
The former question-licensing of trademarks and
"nominative" rights in instruments underlying
derivatives-has generated significant litigation,
particularly on the part of current and potential creators of
stock indices (which constitute the underlying instrument
for many modern financial products).61 Once a marketing
tool for financial publishers and exchanges, indices have
come into great demand with the emergence of portfolio
59. Although there are various models correlating the performance of spot
and futures prices in indices, there is considerable inquiry into whether index
futures "lead" stock prices in incorporating new information or "lag" behind
them. See, e.g., Alex Frino, Terry Walter & Andrew West, The Lead-Lag
Relationship Between Equities and Stock Index Futures Markets Around
Information Releases, 20 J. FUTURES MKTS. 467 (2000) (suggesting spot markets
may lead in the incorporation of firm-specific information, while futures
markets may lead in the incorporation of macroeconomic information).
Economists hypothesize that traders will choose to trade in the market that
offers the least transaction and leverage costs, all other things being equal. See,
e.g., Minho Kim, Andrew C. Szakmary & Thomas V. Schwarz, Trading Costs
and Price Discovery Across Stock Index Futures and Cash Markets, 19 J.
FUTURES MKTS. 475 (1999).
60. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release
No. 50,700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, at 71,271 (Dec. 8, 2004); Market Data Concept
Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613 (Dec. 17, 1999); see also, e.g., Gaston F. Ceron,
Nasdaq Will Unveil Next Week System for Better Opening Quotes, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 2004, at C3. Nasdaq upgraded its opening and closing cross procedures
in order to provide a definitive opening and closing price, among other reasons,
to encourage Standard & Poor's and Dow Jones to use its prices when
computing index values for Nasdaq-listed stocks rather than AMEX prices. Id.
61. An index consists of a list of component stocks, commodities or other
inputs, and an algorithm for computing an index value based on the observed
values of the underlying components. See MILLERS, supra note 57, at 6.
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theory and the importance of benchmarking. 62 Many index
providers have entered into exclusive licensing
arrangements with derivatives exchanges and (as discussed
below) other financial product providers. 63
Accordingly, index providers have sought to protect the
essence of their work product-the list of securities and
indexing methodology 64-through a variety of intellectual
property regimes. 65 Some index providers have sought to
copyright the list of securities composing an index to deter
rivals from publishing competing indices that closely track
its components. 66 While the "idea" of a particular indexing
methodology may not be copyrightable, the selection of
index components may be protected under copyright law if
it carries the Feist-ian "quantum of originality."67
The principal cause of action advanced in litigation,
however, has been misappropriation of trademark rights.68
62. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES 484-93 (2002).
63. See, e.g., Affidavit of Paul R. Aaronson in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary Injunction, McGraw-
Hill Co., Inc. v. ISE, No. 1:05-cv-112, 2005 WL 2100518 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005)
(on file with Buffalo Law Review).
64. See HARRIS, supra note 62, at 484-86 (describing various weighting
methodologies commonly used for computing index values).
65. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and
the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
411 (1983) (discussing intellectual property protection for indices).
66. Recently, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) brought suit against
the International Stock Exchange (ISE) seeking damages for copyright
infringement because the ISE's HVY gold index allegedly mimicked "almost
exactly" the PHLX's XAU gold/silver index. PHLX v. ISE, No. 1:05-cv-5390,
2005 WL 2923519, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005). The case was dismissed voluntarily
after the court refused to grant preliminary injunctive relief against the launch
of ISE's index. See Court Refuses to Stop Launch of ISE Option at Request of
Phlx, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), June 10, 2005.
67. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991)
(selection of nine statistical categories for use on pitching form found
sufficiently original); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984)
(designation of baseball cards as "premium" or "nonpremium" sufficiently
original to warrant copyright protection).
68. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri's Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d
377, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2006) (eight elements demonstrate trademark confusion:
"(1) strength of the mark, (2) relatedness of the goods, (3) similarity of the
marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) likely
degree of purchaser care and sophistication, (7) defendant's intent in selecting
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With respect to derivatives on common stock, 69 no such
misappropriation has been held to exist. In Golden Nugget
v. American Stock Exchange,70 an issuer of common stock
had argued that the trading of options on its stock without
prior consent constituted a misappropriation of property,
infringement of trademark, and unfair competition. After
dispensing with AMEX's argument that federal regulation
of the options markets preempted state law,71 the court held
that the issuer had no "property or other protectable
interest in [its] common stock owned by its shareholders"
that would "allow it to control the manner or means of
resale of its shares."72 The court further held that the mere
nondeceptive use of a trade name to identify a product
when resold in the secondary market (via a listed option)
did not violate a manufacturer's trademark, and that there
was no deception or appropriation of the issuer's property to
warrant a finding of unfair competition. 73
For stock indices, courts have reached technically
distinguishable, if substantively discordant conclusions. 74
In Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co.,75 the Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago (CBOT) had sought to offer a
its mark and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines using the marks").
See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 11.
69. Prior to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763, Part I (2000) (CFMA), the only exchange-traded derivatives
permitted on individual equity securities were equity options traded on an SEC-
registered exchange. The CFMA permitted trading in "security futures" subject
to joint regulation by the SEC and the CFTC. Id.
70. 828 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1987). The SEC permitted listing of the
options without issuer consent. Release Discussing Exchanges' and NASD's
Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 22,026, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,310,
at 20,313-14 (May 8, 1985).
71. See infra Part III.A.
72. Golden Nugget, 828 F.2d at 590.
73. Stock may trade in the over-the-counter market-or pursuant to
unlisted trading privileges on any stock exchange-without the permission of
the issuer. Ludlow Corp. v. SEC, 604 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (no exclusive
right as to where stock is traded).
74. The International Stock Exchange has recently filed a complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking to end the
exclusive listing of DJIA and S&P 500 index options on the Chicago Board
Options Exchange. Int'l Secs. Exch., LLC v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 1:06-cv-12878
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006).
75. 98 Ill. 2d 109 (1983).
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commodity futures contract on the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA); unlike the Golden Nugget options, the Dow
Jones futures would be settled in cash, based on changes in
the value of the DJIA index. CBOT sought a declaratory
judgment that use of the DJJA in this manner would not
constitute a "commercial misappropriation 'of the Dow
Jones index and averages... since CBOT's use of the DJIA
would not compete with Dow Jones' news service (in the
context of which the DJIA was developed). 76 The Supreme
Court of Illinois found in favor of Dow Jones, primarily on
the ground that the recognition of a proprietary interest in
a single stock index would have the effect of encouraging
development of new indices. 77
A similar result was obtained in Standard & Poor's
Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc.,7s in which Standard &
Poor's (now owned by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.)
asked the Second Circuit to affirm an injunction against
Comex's trading in futures contracts modeled on the
Standard & Poor's 500 index (the "S&P 500"). In Comex,
S&P had entered into a licensing agreement with the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange to list an S&P 500 contract,
but refused to license use of the index to Comex. Comex
thereafter developed a futures contract on the "Comex 500
Stock Index," which according to Comex's filings with the
CFTC "essentially duplicated" the S&P 500 index. 79 The
district court had based its decision in part on a Lanham
Act claim that the juxtaposition of the words "500" and
"stock index," together with the use of the S&P 500 index as
reference price, demonstrated a "likelihood of confusion" as
to the source or sponsorship of the Comex product.8 0
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that
appropriate disclaimers might eliminate source confusion,
the court upheld the district court's injunction on the
76. Id. at 115.
77. Id. at 127.
78. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
79. In its listing application to the CFTC, Comex indicated that the
settlement price of the Comex 500 contract would be the "then current Standard
& Poor's 500 Index value," which "made clear that a separately calculated
Comex 500 Stock Index never existed." Id. at 706.
80. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063,
1065-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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grounds that defendants misappropriated a "salable
product" that required significant "money, labor and
expertise" to calculate in a reliable and accurate manner.8 1
Two members of the panel nevertheless drew the
distinction between S&P's business of publishing an index
value and Comex's business of marketing futures contracts
that settle based on the published index value. In
particular, the court stressed the "different, novel, and
close" issue whether S&P's interest in the index was "the
type of interest ... that is capable of being protected ...
against the unlicensed use by Comex in marketing a
futures contract using the [S&P]'s index as a settlement
price."8 2
Despite frequent requests by various market
participants for intervention, the Commission to date has
refrained from regulating rights in market indices. In
approving the listing of index-based options in 1982, the
Commission indicated a "regulatory interest" in reviewing
indices' composition, calculation, and adjustment
procedures, as well as the widespread dissemination of
index prices.8 3  Nevertheless, while the Commission
permitted multiple trading of such options in that release,
it acknowledged that such permission entailed no 'legal
determination by the Commission with respect to the
validity of any copyright, trademark, service market or
related claims' with respect to the index" since the issue
had not been raised at the time.8 4 In subsequent releases,
81. 683 F.2d at 710. The court noted that Comex's product directly competed
with CME's S&P contract, in which S&P had a financial interest by virtue of
the licensing agreement.
82. Id. at 712 (Newman, J., concurring); see also id. (Knapp, J., concurring).
83. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No.
19,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,981 (Nov. 30, 1982). The Commission had also sought to
prohibit futures trading in indices that were not broad-based and therefore had
the potential to be used to engage in manipulation or insider trading with
respect to individual component securities. Such "narrow-based indices" are
now jointly defined by the SEC and the CFTC pursuant to section 3(a)(55)(B) of
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (2000). See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.3a55-1 to .3a55-3 (2006); Method for Determining Market Capitalization
and Dollar Value of Average Daily Trading Volume, Exchange Act Release No.
44,288, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,560 (May 17, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 41, 240).
84. Statement of Commission Views on Side-by-Side Market Making,
Exchange Act Release No. 22439, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,191 (Sept. 20, 1985) (quoting
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the Commission has refused to resolve "intellectual
property right claims" in deference to the "elaborate
statutory framework" for intellectual property rights under
federal law and the availability of state law claims. 8 5
D. Financial Contract and Product Design
Exchanges and investment banks have sought to assert
proprietary rights with respect to the design and marketing
of financial products. The availability of statutory or
regulatory protection, while perhaps not necessary for the
progress of financial innovation, has nevertheless been
thought to affect the frequency of new listings as well as the
profitability of individual products to their sponsors and
listing markets. In particular, the design of "synthetic" or
"derivative" products tailored to meet investor demand,
liquidity requirements, and even regulatory interests8 6 is
frequently claimed to require significant research and
development for which "first mover" status alone cannot
compensate. 87
Protection for financial product design under formal
intellectual property regimes may be available. Despite the
longstanding judicial created "business methods" exception
to patentable subject matter, recent cases have upheld
NASD's request for clarification of the effect of the Commission's order on the
intellectual property rights of index providers).
85. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Listing and
Trading of Warrants on the Deutscher Aktienindex ("DAX Index"), Exchange
Act Release No. 36,070, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,405 (Aug. 15, 1995) (refusing to delay
approval despite challenge to unlicensed use of underlying index); Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of a
Broad Based Index Option Contract Based on the Japan Index, Exchange Act
Release No. 28,475, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,492 (Oct. 3, 1990) (same).
86. The SEC strongly encouraged the listing of "cash" market equivalents to
index-based derivatives-such as "basket" trading, index participations, and
eventually ETFs-to reduce volatility in cash markets resulting from futures
trading. See, e.g., Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, An Overview of Program Trading
and Its Impact on Current Market Practices (Dec. 21, 1987) (study
commissioned by the NYSE), excerpted in Richard P. Bernard, Trading Baskets,
621 PLI/CORP. 549 (1988); see also Lawrence Harris, Economics of Cash Index
Alternatives, 10 J. FUTURES MKTS. 179-94 (1990) (arguing for the creation of
such products). The CFTC likewise made efforts to obtain authority to list
"futures" on individual equity securities, culminating in the authorization of
"security futures" in the CFMA. See supra note 69.
87. See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 259 (1918).
[Vol. 55
2007] REGULATING INFORMATION
patent protection for certain financial products when their
operation relies on a "practical application" of an algorithm,
such as through a particular computer system or network
that effects the instantaneous calculations and transactions
necessary to achieve the product's objectives.8 8 Similarly,
copyright protection may also extend to proprietary
software used to manage complicated investment
strategies, if not to the product itself.8 9
In many cases, however, new financial products do not
conceptually differ from "prior art" to the degree necessary
to obtain patent protection. 90 For example, exchange-traded
funds (ETFs), unlike traditional index funds, 91 allow the
creation of additional shares without limiting the ability of
the shares to trade on a secondary market. 92 Because ETF
shares may be traded without the participation of the ETF
88. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d
1368 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding patent for "data processing system" for
implementing an investment structure developed for use as an administrator
and accounting agent for mutual funds); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983)
(upholding patent for "data processing methodology for cash management
account"). See generally Douglas L. Price, Comment, Assessing the Patentability
of Financial Services and Products, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
89. See, e.g., Am. Stock Exch., LLC v. Towergate Consultants Ltd., No. 1:03-
cv-856, 2003 WL 21692814 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003).
90. Many new "products," for example, may simply represent the
securitization of computerized trading strategies used by arbitrageurs or
traders that may not qualify for patent protection. In other cases, similar
products may already exist. In a challenge to AMEX's listing of ETFs, for
example, a patent claim on ETF design was held invalid as being part of the
prior art, since AMEX had previously published a proposed rule change by filing
it with the SEC. See, e.g., Am. Stock Exch., LLC v. Mopex, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d
323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
91. Because ETFs do not fit neatly into any of the categories of regulated
investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, ETF
sponsors have routinely sought exemptive relief from the Commission. See
Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Release No. IC-25,258, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,614, at 57,614-15 (Nov. 15, 2001) (describing the development of index-based
ETFs).
92. Unlike traditional index funds, ETF shares can be created only upon
delivery of (or redeemed only in exchange for) a basket of securities that reflects
the composition of the index. The limited creation/redemption feature permits
ETF shares to be traded on an exchange or in the over-the-counter market like
closed-end funds, but without trading at a discount to net asset value. See id. at
57,616-17; see also SEC Website, http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2006).
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sponsor or listing market, competing exchanges have
sought to trade ETFs and related derivatives. If no
protection exists, such products may be poached or dually
listed following their introduction with little recourse for
the product designer. 93 In such cases, issuers may build in
contractual features to protect against free riding. If a
liquid secondary market is necessary, products may be
designed to prohibit or discourage resales without the
intermediation of the sponsor or to incorporate unique
design features that limit fungibility. Such devices would
come at a significant cost, since sponsors would also have to
guarantee the availability of additional liquidity enhancing
services for their branded products as an inducement to
investors concerned about fungibility.94
The extent of protection for such products under state
intellectual property theories may depend on their design.
Merely branding an innovative product may not be an
adequate deterrent to the creation of competing products by
rival issuers.95 Sponsors may therefore seek to bootstrap
trademark protection by entering into exclusive licensing
agreements with owners of a component of the product,
such as an index, that has clear protection under
93. See Gaston F. Ceron & Jen Ryan, Barclays ETFs Defect From Amex,
WALL ST. J., July 21, 2005, at Cll (describing Barclays Global Investors'
decision to move the listing for many of its ETFs to the NYSE following NYSE's
merger with Archipelago); Big Board to Trade Amex-Listed Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2001, at C5 (NYSE's application to trade index-based ETFs pursuant to
unlisted trading privileges); see also Beatrice Boehmer & Ekkehart Boehmer,
Trading Your Neighbor's ETFs: Competition or Fragmentation?, 27 J. BANKING
& FIN. 1667 (2003) (describing the NYSE's dual listing of index-based ETFs and
the impact on inter-exchange competition).
94. See Commission Guidance on the Application of Certain Provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Trading in
Security Futures Products, Exchange Act Release Nos. 8,107, 46,101, 67 Fed.
Reg. 43,234, at 43,241 (Jun. 27, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241).
95. For example, before the U.S. Treasury developed the STRIPS program
for individually trading principal payments and interest coupons on Treasury
securities, a number of investment banks offered the same service through
programs with feline acronyms-e.g., Salomon Brothers' Certificates of Accrual
on Treasury Securities (CATS), Merrill Lynch's Treasury Income Growth
Receipts (TIGRs), and Lehman Brothers' Lehman Investment Opportunity
Notes (LIONs). See David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments
Under the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599,
1667 (1986). It is not clear whether such "copycat" nomenclature could give rise
to an action for trademark infringement. See supra note 66.
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intellectual property law. 96 This strategy failed in three
recent cases involving index-based ETFs: Nasdaq Stock
Market v. Archipelago Holdings LLC, 97 and the consolidated
cases McGraw-Hill Companies v. International Securities
Exchange,98  and Dow Jones & Co. v. International
Securities Exchange (the "ISE Cases").99
In Archipelago, Nasdaq sought to enjoin ArcaEx (at the
time, a trading facility of the Pacific Exchange) from
unlicensed trading of the "QQQ," an exchange-traded fund
sponsored by Nasdaq Financial Products Services (a
Nasdaq subsidiary) based on the Nasdaq-100 stock index.
Nasdaq's claims were based on false advertising and
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, as well as
various state law theories of misappropriation and unfair
competition.10 0 Archipelago countered that Nasdaq's claims
were preempted under the national market system
provisions of the Exchange Act. 1 1 In the ISE Cases, the
owners of the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average sought to prevent the International Securities
Exchange from listing options on various index-based
ETFs-including SPDR shares (based on the S&P 500) and
DIAMONDS shares (based on the DJIA). ISE argued that
an index creator has no protectable property interest with
respect to the listing or trading of an option on an ETF
share, to the extent that such options may be settled by
96. In McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Vanguard Index Trust, McGraw Hill sought to
prevent Vanguard from sponsoring the Vanguard Index Participation Equity
Receipts, or "VIPERS"-an ETF based on the S&P 500 index. 139 F. Supp. 2d
544 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 27 Fed. Appx. 23 (2d Cir. 2001). Vanguard sought to issue
VIPERs under the terms of its existing license to use the Standard & Poor's
trademark in connection with existing Vanguard open-end mutual funds based
on S&P indices.
97. Nasdaq Stock Mkt. v. Archipelago Holdings LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
98. McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006).
99. Dow Jones & Co. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006)
[together with McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., hereinafter referred to
as the ISE Cases].
100. Archipelago, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97.
101. See id.; see also infra Part III.A. The SEC, in its amicus brief, opined
that the Unlisted Trading Privileges Act and other provisions of the Exchange
Act did not preempt claims relating to the marketing of securities under federal
trademark law or state unfair competition law. See Archipelago, 336 F. Supp.
2d at 297, 303.
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delivery of the underlying ETF-rather than settled in cash
based on the value of the respective index on the settlement
date.10 2
In all three cases, the index provider's state law claims
against trademark infringement under the Dow Jones and
Comex cases were rejected in favor of the reasoning in
Golden Nugget. In Archipelago, the district court rejected
Nasdaq's state law claims on the ground that Nasdaq had
no protectable interest with respect to the resale of QQQ
shares on another exchange. The court sought to
distinguish Dow Jones and Comex on the grounds that the
QQQ shares are not "linked to the Index," in the way that
futures contracts refer to the value of an index when
determining the settlement price of the contract at
expiration. In addressing Nasdaq's argument that the
secondary market value of the QQQ shares "cannot be set
without reference to the Index," the court observed that
investors-and not ArcaEx-would set the secondary
market price based on public information disseminated by
Nasdaq. 103
In the ISE Cases, the Second Circuit similarly
concluded that there was no "wrongful use or
misappropriation" of an "intellectual property interest" of
the respective index providers because the index providers
relinquished control over the resale and public trading of
those shares. Because the index providers "intentionally
disseminate their index values to inform the public," the
use of those values by investors in the marketplace did not
constitute misappropriation.104  Moreover, the court
observed that the nominative use of a trademark does not
102. See Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The Unsupportability of Index
Providers' Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of Exchange
Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2004) (arguing that the Unlisted Trading
Privileges Act of 1994 evinces a Congressional intent to prevent the exclusive
listing of ETFs). However, many scholars have advocated exclusive listing
agreements for securities to achieve competing regulatory objectives. See infra
notes 183-85.
103. The court denied Archipelago's motion to dismiss the Lanham Act
claims since, albeit weak, they survived federal pleading requirements. Those
claims related primarily to statements made in ArcaEx's advertising and
promotional campaign that sought to compare the volume and quality of
trading in QQQ shares on Nasdaq and ArcaEx. See Archipelago, 336 F. Supp.
2d at 303-04.
104. ISE Cases, 451 F.3d at 303.
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result in trademark confusion "as long as the trader does
not create confusion by implying an affiliation with the
owner of the product." The court similarly declined to
consider the outcome that would result when "a proprietary
index is employed in the creation of the financial
instrument." 105
Sponsors of new financial products have also sought ad
hoc protection from regulators, with varying degrees of
success. 10 6 The Commission has recognized that a market
center's commitment of "significant resources" to the
creation of new products "on the basis of an exclusive
franchise" might justify exclusive listing rights, as might
reliance upon revenues from such trading as a "vital source
of income." 107 Nevertheless, the Commission and antitrust
authorities have periodically expressed concern over
exclusive listing arrangements for financial products. For
example, in 1989, the Commission rescinded exchange rules
that "prohibit[ed,] condition[ed,] or otherwise limit[ed],
directly or indirectly, the ability of [any such] exchange to
list any stock options class because that options class is
listed on another options exchange." 108 More recently, the
ISE has petitioned the Commission to extend this rule to
index-based options products even as it commenced
litigation in federal court to enjoin such exclusive
licensing.109
105. Id. at 308. As discussed above, supra note 74, ISE has recently sought
to end exclusive listing of S&P 500 and DJIA index options.
106. For example, in a letter to the Commission seeking no-action relief for
the design of its C Index Participation product, PHLX sought assurances from
the SEC that it would not approve rule filings submitted by competing
exchanges to list comparable products. Letter from Nicholas A. Giordano,
President, PHLX, to SEC (June 29, 1988), reprinted in Bernard, supra note 88,
at app. E (asking whether it would further the development of new products "to
permit another marketplace, without incurring or sharing in development costs,
to copy and initiate simultaneous trading of an instrument or new securities
product developed at considerable cost by another marketplace that seeks to
recover those costs in successful trading of that instrument").
107. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No.
19,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,981, at 53,983 (Nov. 30, 1982).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-5 (1989), adopted in Multiple Trading of
Standardized Options, Exchange Act Release No. 26,870, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,976
(June 5, 1989).
109. Letter from ISE to the Commission, Request for Rulemaking to Amend
Rule 19c-5 Regarding Certain Options Exchange Licensing Arrangements (Nov.
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E. Standards and Protocols
The ownership of the standards and protocols that
govern securities market disclosures and transactions has
received significant scholarly attention in recent years. 110
Given the highly technical nature of standard-setting, it
has historically been the province of industry consortia or
self-regulatory bodies with the relevant incentives and
expertise. Because of the significant positive and negative
externalities associated with standards, there is
considerable pressure on regulators to control, or at least
tightly oversee, their stewardship-particularly when
regulatory policy mandates exclusivity of standards.
Standard-setting in securities markets has proceeded in
a number of ways over the history of securities
regulation."' Some are legislated, such as the mandatory
terms of the Trust Indenture Act.1 2 Some are established
by the Commission-for example, the rules and regulations
governing the preparation and formatting of non-financial
disclosure. These might include, for example, the
Commission's initiative to develop an extensible business
reporting language (XBRL) for electronic submission of § 13
reports and other Exchange Act filings. In such cases, the
licensing and modification of standards are fused with the
agency's responsibility to comply with appropriate process
requirements under the federal securities laws and
administrative procedure.
Some standards are established by SROs. "Generally
accepted auditing standards," formerly promulgated by the
American Institute for Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) and overseen by the now-defunct Public Oversight
Board (POB), became the exclusive domain of the Public
1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-469.htm
(requesting that the Commission promulgate a rule to "prohibit an options
exchange from being a party to exclusive or preferential licensing arrangements
with respect to index option products and options overlying other instruments,
including options on securities whose value is based on an index").
110. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law:
Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291
(2005).
111. See generally David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property: An
Economic Approach, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1109 (1994).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000).
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Company Accounting Oversight Board as a result of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.113 Exchange listing standards,
member rules, order and transaction reporting formats, and
other self-regulatory recordkeeping and reporting
requirements are also examples. To the extent that self-
regulatory organizations establish standards through
formal rules, § 19 of the Exchange Act establishes a "mini-
APA" to ensure an opportunity for public notice and
comment in the standard-setting process. 114
Other standards are privately owned yet can have the
effect of public law. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board has been delegated authority to establish "generally
accepted accounting principles" for the preparation of
financial statements. 1 5 Law firms, investment banks, and
their respective industry associations largely control the
"boilerplate" provisions that govern indentures for publicly
traded debt.1 6  McGraw-Hill, acting on behalf of the
American Bankers' Association, administers the CUSIP
system for the assignment of unique identification codes for
financial instruments. Various trade associations maintain
standard documentation for common industry
transactions."17
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-103, 116 Stat.
745, 755 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7213). For a discussion of PCAOB's
anomalous status as a self-regulatory organization, see generally Donna M.
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000). For a description of the "mini-APA" provisions
of Exchange Act § 19, see 6 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 2701-32 (3d ed. 1989).
115. See Cunningham, supra note 110, at 312.
116. See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate'), 83 VA.
L. REV. 713 (1997); Symposium, "Boilerplate" Foundations of Market Contracts,
104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
117. For example, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
maintains documentation for over-the-counter derivative transactions; the
Securities Industry Association and The Bond Market Association (which have
merged to become the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association)
maintain documentation for common securities financing transactions; and the
Financial Market Lawyers Group (sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York), maintains documentation for currency exchange agreements. See
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 116, at 763.
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The "value" of standards, once established, is
determined largely by organizational structure. Congress,
for example, has enacted special levies on reporting
companies to pay for the maintenance and development of
accounting and auditing standards. 118 Part of the fees
charged by self-regulatory organizations may be expected to
be dedicated to the maintenance of its intellectual property;
to the extent that membership in such organizations is
mandatory for broker-dealers or other professionals, such
standards may be indirectly subsidized by industry
groups. 119 Private entities, by contrast, must rely on sales
and licensing fees (where permissible) or voluntary
membership dues. In the latter two settings, larger
members (or payers of significant licensing fees) could have
undue influence over modifications of such standards.120
Courts have debated what level of protection to afford
property rights-such as copyright or trademark rights-in
standards owned by private or quasi-governmental entities,
when legislators or regulators require adherence to such
standards either de jure or de facto. 21 For example,
commentators have drawn parallels to cases in which
industry associations have sought to exercise exclusive
publication rights with respect to "codes" or other materials
that are later enacted wholesale into law or regulation. 122
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 109, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745,
769-70 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7219).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(8).
120. Cunningham, supra note 110, at 330-31.
121. For example, to formalize the Commission's authority over the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Commission was formally given the
authority under § 19(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (as amended by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) to "recognize, as 'generally accepted' for purposes
of the securities laws, any accounting principles established by a standard
setting body" that met certain organizational requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)
(2000 & Supp. 2005). In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided for FASB's
funding by a levy on reporting companies. § 109, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745, 769-70 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7219).
122. Professor Cunningham has identified a number of U.S. circuit court
cases considering the availability of copyright protection to codes adopted
formally or informally as "law": Bldg. Officials & Code Admin. v. Code Tech.,
628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980) (denying preliminary injunction to copyright holder
for failure to establish substantial likelihood of success on the merits); CCC
Info. Serv. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994)
(reference to copyrighted work as a legal standard by legislature does not result
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In such cases, commentators have recognized the risk that
private owners' ability to control the duplication or
dissemination of standards may hinder, if not prevent,
equal access to law.123 More importantly, groups petitioning
for a modification of standards to address new or
unforeseen situations might find themselves shut out of the
standard- setting process, particularly if competing
standards are not permitted.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATORY INTERVENTION
Regulation of intellectual property rights in securities
markets is largely motivated by the traditional concern of
inadequate, incomplete or inaccurate disclosure with
respect to specific issuers or securities. Organized
exchanges, to a certain degree, developed mechanisms for
securities disclosure and market information at the turn of
the last century, and market-based approaches to
information regulation emerged even before the scope of
proprietary rights was settled under securities law or other
applicable federal or state law. Congress has nevertheless
rejected the "all-or-none" proprietary rights paradigm in
favor of an approach that balances the competing economic
and noneconomic objectives in intellectual property and
information law in a variety of specific industries and with
respect to specific technologies. 124 In the federal securities
in loss of copyright); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516
(9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (contract between
Heath Care Financing Administration and AMA to use AMA coding system did
not invalidate AMA's copyright); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d
791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Cunningham, supra note 110, at 300-07.
123. See Cunningham, supra note 110, at 300-07.
124. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004)
(describing this shift and attributing it in part to policymakers' belief that
liability rules are able to mitigate market failures); see also Jay P. Kesan &
Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2005); Reza Dibadj,
Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 745 (2004).
Commentators have noted the preference of policymakers to rely on detailed
"liability" rules for regulating interests in information products rather than the
traditionally broader "proprietary" claims that characterized turn-of-the-
century intellectual property protection. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
613 (1999), citing DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 15-16
(1992).
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arena, this is evident in both the increasing regulatory
authority over such common law rights that Congress has
conferred on the Commission 125 and the Commission's
highly detailed regulations-often characterized as
"micromanagerial" or "command-and-control" by its critics. 126
Intellectual property policy also plays a significant role
in how markets are structured, how market supervision is
financed, and how closely the Commission is able to
supervise the evolution of market standards. 127 To the
extent that the offering and trading of securities requires
coordination among market participants, Congress has
impliedly provided limited exemptions from the federal
antitrust laws while conferring limited authority upon the
Commission to supervise and, when necessary intervene, on
an ongoing basis in those arrangements. Because the
Commission lacks the powers of other economic regulators,
the ability to modify intellectual property rights in various
types of securities information can provide a useful tool for
managing competition.
Such intervention is of course susceptible to numerous
pitfalls. Lack of Commission expertise or resources,
regulatory capture by stock exchanges, SROs, and major
125. See, e.g., Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 § 11A(a)(1), Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1) (market information and
securities information processors); Securities Act of 1934 § 15(g), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(g) (2000) (amended by Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 § 505, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931, 953-54) (requirements for transactions in penny stocks);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 755-56
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213) (auditing standards); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 108, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 768-69 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7218)
(accounting standards).
126. The number of former commissioners who have criticized the
Commission's regulatory approach, if nothing more, illustrates the difficulties
faced by the Commission in using its statutory authority to regulate market
macrostructure. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, Op-Ed., Over-Lawyered at the SEC,
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15; Steven M. H. Wallman, Competition,
Innovation, and Regulation in the Securities Markets, 53 Bus. LAw. 341 (1998);
Richard Hill, Glassman Says Court Decisions an Affirmation of "Economists"
Approach, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), July 7, 2006 (reporting former commissioner's
remarks regarding recent D.C. Circuit decisions vacating SEC rulemaking from
which she had dissented).
127. See, e.g., Zohar Gosher & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (arguing that the ultimate
goal of securities regulation is not investor protection, but "to attain efficient
markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy").
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investment banks, deference to industry representatives in
the absence of organized investor advocacy, and
bureaucratic process and unresponsiveness have all been
cited as harbingers of potentially damaging regulatory
failures. 128  The lack of clear legislative guidance
complicates the agency's perspective: 129  Securities
regulation is generally advanced under the rubric of
"investor confidence" or "investor protection," as is the
SEC's statutory mandate. 130  The goals of economic
efficiency and capital formation, where they appear in the
federal securities laws, serve as decidedly secondary
considerations. 13 Moreover, the implementation of investor
128. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982)
(addressing arguments for and against regulation generally); George W.
Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the
Capture Hypothesis, 8 BELL J. ECON. 128 (1977).
129. Section 11A of the Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(i)-
(v) (2000), often cited by the Commission as creating clear legislative guidance
for its market information regulatory activities, contains a number of general
goals-economically efficient execution of securities transactions; fair
competition, availability of quotation and transaction information, the
practicability of executing investors' orders in the best market; and an
opportunity, "consistent with" the foregoing provisions, for unintermediated
execution of orders-without significant discussion of how to reconcile
competing objectives. Id.
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000) (national market system for securities;
securities information processors); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2000) (registration and
regulation of brokers and dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (2000) (national system for
clearance and settlement of securities transactions); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-2 (2000)
(automated quotation systems for penny stocks); 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2000)
(registration, responsibilities, and oversight of self-regulatory organizations);
see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty (Georgetown Law & Economics Research
Paper No. 947510, 2006), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=947510
(discussing the SEC's behavior in its exercise of discretion under the guise of
"investor protection").
The Commission is not the only agency that is charged with balancing
subjective goals of investor protection against the goals of efficiency and
competition. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, More Than Law Enforcement: The
FTC's Many Tools-A Conversation with Tim Muris and Bob Pitofsky, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 800-01 (2005) (discussing the relationship between the
Federal Trade Commission's objectives of enhancing "consumer protection" and
preventing "unfairness" against the objectives of promoting efficient markets).
131. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2000)
(requiring the Commission to consider whether regulatory action "will promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation"). Although Executive Order
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), which requires agencies to assess the
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protection goals may appear inconsistent across unrelated
rulemaking exercises.
A. Countering Underproduction
Perhaps the most pervasive justification for infringing
upon the informational rights of securities market
participants is the possibility of underproduction. 132
Ownership implies the right to exclude, and absent special
circumstances, the refusal to license intellectual property is
not considered misuse of one's property rights. 133 Absent
regulatory restrictions, the owner may arbitrarily refuse to
license its protected intellectual property or information to
any person or class of persons, or to charge certain persons
or classes of persons a greater or lesser price for the use of
the same product.
costs and benefits of proposed regulatory actions, does not apply to independent
agencies such as the Commission, the Commission has traditionally published a
cost/benefit analysis in connection with its rulemaking activities. In the recent
case Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit twice chided the
Commission for its failure to consider the economic costs of, and alternatives to,
a proposed regulatory action. 443 F.3d 890, 894-96 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (remanding rule requiring an
independent chairman and minimum number of "independent" directors for the
boards of registered investment companies).
132. See Coffee, supra note 20; Mahoney, supra note 20; Edward B. Rock,
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002). Underproduction may be
viewed as a subset of the "selective disclosure" problem discussed in Part II.B.
Most business or market information is routinely shared with officers, directors,
employees, agents, business partners, exchange members, customers, and other
parties. Apart from the additional costs of compiling, formatting, and ensuring
the accuracy of such information, this information is already produced to a
degree. The question then becomes when and on what terms publication or
production to investors is required. In the current environment, the costs of
compiling and formatting will likely decrease as the SEC expands the use of
web-based collection and publication techniques and firms increasingly
automate compliance. See Langevoort, supra note 20. Whether such declining
costs will compensate for the perceived increase in accuracy-enhancing rules,
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's internal control requirements, is the subject of
debate. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Irony on "Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006); Cory L.
Braddock, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors Would Be Foolish to Pay a
Penny or a Pound For the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 2006 BYU L.
REV. 175 (2006).
133. See supra notes 12-14.
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Owners of information often invoke the right to
withhold information to protect against free-riding by
competitors.134 If the costs of contracting for confidentiality
are excessive or enforcement mechanisms are limited or
unreliable, underproduction may be a firm's optimal
strategy for preserving the value of its information.
Likewise, if it is difficult to weigh the value to the owner of
keeping such information confidential (apart from the cost
of compilation and production) against the social value of
sharing information with the marketplace, 135 owners may
prefer to underproduce by default. 13 6 The degree to which
underproduction is a viable strategy depends, among other
criteria, on the speed with which the information may be
reproduced without the creator's consent, the shelf-life of
the information once disclosed, the circle of individuals who
require access to the information, and the ability of the
creator directly or indirectly to limit its competitors' access
to its protected works. 137
For some kinds of information, such as index
components, index values, rules, standards, and financial
contract design, underproduction is not a viable strategy.
For example, an index has no commercial value unless its
component securities are publicly known; otherwise, there
134. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 35. Other incentives to
underproduce may exist as well, such as agency costs resulting from the
misalignment of managerial incentives in the context of public company
disclosure, and of the incentives of specialists and dealers who make markets in
securities in the context of market information. The existence of disclosure
requirements may be insufficient to compel accurate or complete disclosures in
these circumstances, as evidenced by the breakdown of internal and external
controls at firms such as Enron, WorldCom, and others. See, e.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it
Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003).
135. Such costs may take the form of overinvestment by investors in
negotiating for or replicating the information management has in its
possession, or underinvestment by management in collecting information of
material interest to investors. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 725-35.
136. Id. at 722 (noting the negative externality resulting from the collective
action problems associated with investor bargaining for company disclosures).
137. For example, some market centers (particularly those without high
agency costs or dominant market share) freely disseminate depth-of-book
quotation information. Quotation information is sufficiently ephemeral that
active display of live quotations may induce investors to trade through these
systems. See, e.g., ISE Announces Introduction of Fully Displayed Stock Market,
SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 28, 2006.
2007]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
is no way to gauge the adequacy of the index as a
benchmark, to track the performance of the index, or to
hedge effectively against the index or subsets thereof. The
index's weighting system and treatment of routine events
affecting index value must likewise be predictable.
Moreover, once in the public domain, the list of component
securities or weighting methodology is not expected to
change for significant periods of time.138 Accordingly, to be
widely adopted, they must be made available to the public,
and are accordingly either licensed or distributed free of
charge (at least until they attain the status of a dominant
benchmark). 139
In advancing the underproduction thesis, regulators
must justify how to establish the minimum amount of
information that should be required to be disclosed. In
theory, the optimal amount of information would be the
amount that institutional and other professional investors
or market participants might bargain for, if they were able
to act collectively. 140 In a "property rights"-oriented system,
owners and consumers of information would devise
collective mechanisms to negotiate an appropriate level of
disclosure through intermediaries, such as exchanges, 141
138. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR'S, S&P U.S. INDICES: INDEX METHODOLOGY
5-6 (2007), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/
SP USIndicesMethodology-Web.pdf ("Standard & Poor's believes turnover in
index membership should be avoided when possible."). In addition to actions
that may affect the composition of an index, numerous adjustments are made to
indices on a regular basis to reflect corporate actions that may affect continuity
of the index's reported value. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Data Services: Index
Alert (US), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/uspage.product/data
servicesiaus/2,9,5,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0.htnl (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
139. Owners of such information may nevertheless require potential users
or redisseminators to enter into licensing agreements, even if they do not intend
to charge for such use or redissemination, to preserve other proprietary rights
in such data. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 537-39 (1998) (describing
licensing practices); see, e.g., Affidavit of Paul R. Aaronson in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary
Injunction at Exhibit A, McGraw-Hill Co., Inc. v. ISE, No. 1:05-cv-112, 2005 WL
2100518 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005) (License Agreement dated May 21, 2002
between S&P and ISE, requiring ISE to acknowledge S&P's "proprietary rights"
in the S&P Indexes) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
140. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 687-92.




state corporate codes, 142 rating agencies, independent
investment banks or other investment services firms, or
other bodies that have the expertise and personnel to
ensure that a firm has provided what it has contracted to
provide. 143 While significant differences among disclosure
standards may make it more difficult to compare
information across firms,144 the Commission could, in
theory, mandate interoperability of disclosure "standards"
(as discussed below) to minimize the burden on investors
without mandating minimum content. The Commission, in
such a world, could also stand ready to enforce breaches of
disclosure commitments under federal antifraud rules.
In the context of company information, however,
Congress has instead required companies with publicly held
securities 145 to disclose periodically certain financial and
nonfinancial information determined by the Commission. 146
The SEC has, through incremental rulemaking, attempted
to define both what information is relevant to capital
formation and how the "materiality" of such information
may be assessed (whether quantitatively or qualitatively 147)
for purposes of determining the extent of disclosure.
Scholars and other commentators have routinely debated
the merits of this mandatory disclosure system: on the one
hand, some maintain that such a system entails both loss of
the competitive value of keeping such information
confidential and an unreasonably high cost of publishing
142. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE
FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002).
143. See Palmiter, supra note 29, at 111-16.
144. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 744-45.
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2000); 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1 (2006) (requiring filing
of § 13 reports by issuers of securities that are listed on an exchange, or that are
held by 500 or more U.S. shareholders if the issuer has ten million dollars or
more in assets); 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2000) (requiring issuers of securities that
are the subject of a registered offering under the Securities Act of 1933 to
submit an undertaking to file § 13 reports).
146. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000);
Regulations S-K and S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229 (2006).
147. See, e.g., Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug.
19, 1999) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). Often, additional disclosures are
motivated by contemporary scandals or crises, leading some scholars to deride
incremental disclosure obligations as political window dressing. See, e.g.,
Romano, supra note 25, at 1591-94; Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 77 (2003).
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information and employing internal and external controls to
ensure its accuracy. 148 Others have defended the current
levels of disclosure public firms provide as being largely
similar to what is required in private capital-raising
transactions, in which disclosure standards are largely
shaped by the institutional investment community. 149
In the context of market information, the SEC's
disclosure agenda appears largely motivated by broader
economic considerations discussed below in Part II.D,
although the underproduction argument is frequently
invoked as well. In addition to reports of completed
transactions (which arguably are unprotected "facts"),
exchanges, market makers, and alternative trading systems
are required to publish the best-priced orders and/or quotes
on the "bid" and "ask" side of the market for every "national
market system" security they trade. 150 The SEC has also
considered whether further information-such as "depth of
book" quotations and customer orders-should be subject to
mandatory display.15 1 Unlike public company information,
however, market information is sold, not freely distributed
in many cases.
148. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and
the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Mahoney, supra note 141, at 1455 (stating
that regulatory competition among the securities exchanges is most effective);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). But see Coffee, supra note 20, at 750-52
(arguing that a mandatory disclosure system would enhance market efficiency);
Donald Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 136 (2002)
("The ones with the explaining to do are the believers in market efficiency,
especially those whose faith is so strong in its miraculous healing powers that
they think legally mandated disclosure has little role to play in investor
protection.").
149. See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004).
150. Regulation NMS Rule 602(b), 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b) (2006); Regulation
ATS, Rule 301(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3); see also Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 2, 2005) (adopting
release) (describing the Commission's revised Quote and Order Handling Rules)
[hereinafter Regulation NMS Adopting Release].
151. Regulation NMS Adopting Release, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,567-68.
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B. Leveling the Playing Field
When advancing selective disclosure and price
discrimination as regulatory concerns, ironically, regulators
have invoked ownership rights in information (for example,
by "shareholders" of a public company or other sources of
misappropriated information) as a means of justifying
prosecution of persons who selectively use or disclose
information. Here, regulators must determine when
differential disclosures to investors by the same owner
should be permissible (on a negotiated basis or
otherwise152), or whether all investors should be entitled to
"fair disclosure" of all information (or at least some
minimum degree of information) revealed to one or more
investors.
In the context of company information, for example,
prohibitions against selective disclosure (or use) have been
incorporated into Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 relying, in part,
on the state law tort of misappropriation of confidential
information.153 Classical insider trading cases typically
focused on the conduct of officers, directors, employees, and
agents (vis-A-vis their firms), while later cases have
recognized the derivative duties of individuals receiving
endogenous, material non-public information to the "source"
of such information.154 Because of the limitations of Rule
10b-5, the SEC has sought to prevent issuers from
selectively disclosing material nonpublic information, even
in the absence of a purchase or sale of its securities, under
Regulation FD. 155
Despite these various proscriptions, the Commission
has recognized that selective disclosure may be necessary to
152. For example, private placements of securities are exempt from the
public offering restrictions under § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (2000), as long as all offerees have sufficient access to or disclosure of
such information about the issuer and possess the necessary sophistication to
"fend for themselves" when contemplating an investment. Doran v. Petroleum
Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d. 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953)).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
154. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.10b5-1-.10b5-2 (2006).
155. 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2006).
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permit effective capital-raising.156 Institutional investors
participating in a private placement of debt or equity
securities may require more current or detailed information
about a firm than other investors receive through federally
mandated securities disclosure. 157 The growing importance
of private investment in public equity (PIPEs) -5 8 -as well
as the staggering volume of privately placed debt
securities- 5 9 -demonstrates that issuers must retain some
flexibility under federal securities law to attract capital
through selective disclosure (which themselves are
protected by contract or state misappropriation law).
For market information, the Commission routinely, if
cautiously, permits price discrimination, if not selective
disclosure. Different exchanges and market makers offer
multi-leveled quotations and quotation montages, limit
order books, and other specialty information at different
price levels. 160 In part, this is feasible because the shelf life
156. In its release adopting Regulation FD, the Commission noted that
reporting companies that proposed to engage in unregistered offerings (such as
a private placement) would not be exempt from Regulation FD's prohibition
against selective disclosure, but noted that "[i]ssuers who undertake private
unregistered offerings generally disclose the information to the investors on a
confidential basis" and could therefore rely upon the exclusion in clause (ii) of
paragraph (a)(2) to avoid a violation of the Rule. Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 7,881, 43,154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
at 51,724 (Aug. 24, 2000).
157. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)-(b), (g).
158. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Ambiguous Boundaries Between Public
and Private Securities Markets, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 483 (2001); Leib M.
Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPEs: Why the SEC Can and Should Expand the
Reporting Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities, 58
Bus. LAw. 655 (2003). The Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation has suggested that "[tjhe growing private equity market is
increasingly substituting for the public market," and that private equity firms
are "increasingly existing investments through negotiated private sales . . .
rather than the traditional public IPO." INTERIM REPORT, supra note 25, at 36.
The report notes that, by one estimate, secondary buyouts accounted for
"around 16 percent of global private equity deals" in 2005, and echoed the
question whether the 'secondary market' in private equity is 'the new stock
market."' (citing News Analysis, Secondary Buyouts: The New Stock Market?,
EUR. VENTURE CAP. & PRIVATE EQUITy J., July-Aug. 2005, at 7).
159. See Susan Chaplinsky & Latha Ramchand, The Impact of SEC Rule
144A on Corporate Debt Issuance by International Firms, 77 J. Bus. 1073
(2004).
160. See, e.g., NASDAQ Data Products, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/tra
der/mds/nasdaqfeeds/feeds.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2007); NYSE Group,
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of quotation information is extremely limited, and such
additional information is relevant only to investment and
market professionals who have the resources and expertise
to profit from it-e.g., through arbitrage transactions. By
contrast, even in comparatively efficient markets, it is not
clear how quickly selectively disclosed information about
individual firms would be incorporated into market
prices, 161 particularly given that the value of material
information is ostensibly measured by its likely influence
over average investors. 162
C. Assuring Quality, Integrity, and Accuracy
In addition to the quantity of information available to
various market participants, the Commission has focused
efforts on improving the quality, integrity, and accuracy of
various types of information product. Intellectual property
law is generally content-neutral with respect to the quality,
integrity, and accuracy of information: errors in information
are not actionable (except in cases of libel or fraud) and in
any event, easily disclaimed. 163 Users or licensors may
bargain for greater quality, for third-party assurances, or
other forms of verification, and owners of information may
have an incentive to internalize such costs as a means of
distinguishing themselves from "lemons" in the
Inc. Information for Market Professionals, http://www.nyse.comlaudience/
marketprofessionals.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2007).
161. The requirement that material information unintentionally disclosed
under Regulation FD be publicly disclosed "in no event after the later of 24
hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange" suggests that the Commission does not believe such information will
be dissipated immediately. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d)
(definition of the term "promptly").
162. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (test for
materiality under Rule 10b-5 is whether there is a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available' (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976))).
163. See NIMMER, supra note 3, §§ 10:63-:64, at 10-25 to -29. As Nimmer
notes, the transformation of the information industry has nevertheless placed
information intermediaries in the position of vouching for the quality and
integrity of information, even as their role in capital allocation diminishes. See
id. § 1:7, 1-10 to -12.
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marketplace.164 Such efforts are most likely to be
worthwhile when the marginal benefits of more accurate or
higher-quality information outweigh the marginal cost of
providing such verification. 165
When minimum standards of quality assurance are set
by the SEC, the parties' traditional cost/benefit analysis is
supplanted. Recent controversies over the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act's section 404 disclosure control reporting requirements
illustrate the difficulties inherent in determining the cost-
effectiveness of disclosure when the information generated
has no tangible commercial value and cannot be subjected
to a ready cost/benefit analysis. 166 This is particularly
problematic when strict liability standards apply, as in the
context of securities offerings under the Securities Act. 167
Yet there are few models to suggest how investors might
purchase accuracy-enhancing information without violating
federal selective disclosure prohibitions. 168
The same problem recurs for other types of information
where the detail of information may outweigh its
usefulness. For example, when the SEC requires that trade
information be reported with greater granularity (e.g.,
penny increments, instead of sixteenths or nickels), not only
are markets obligated to produce such data, but brokers
and institutional investors are effectively required to
purchase it to comply with regulatory and fiduciary
requirements. 169 In addition to the fixed and marginal costs
of bandwidth that such greater precision entails, 170 even the
164. See supra note 21; George Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons"- Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 89 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
165. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Romano, supra note 25.
167. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000) (no due diligence
defense for issuer of securities subject to a § 5 registered offering).
168. See supra Part II.B.
169. The SEC's Vendor Display Rule bars, for example, the sale by brokers
and vendors of individual quotation data without consolidated market
information. 17 C.F.R. 242.602.
170. In options markets, where over a hundred series of options may trade
simultaneously on a single issue, the Options Price Reporting Authority and
data vendors have struggled to comply with decimal price reporting. See Press
Release, SEC Chairman Cox Urges Options Exchanges to Start Limited Penny
Quoting (June 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2006/2006-
91.htm.
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SEC does not appear to believe that more precise
information will always lead to better execution
opportunities. 171
The unpredictable breadth of the federal securities
antifraud regime creates additional costs. One of the
reasons for conferring property rights, as discussed above,
is to require prospective owners to internalize potential loss
resulting from use of the asset, such as the erroneous
reporting of quotations or the erroneous computation of an
index price, either by disclaiming or assuming such liability
by negotiation. 172 Attempts to disclaim such exposure are
ubiquitous: Exchanges require them as a condition of
disseminating market data, while index providers require
them as a condition of using index values in connection with
trading in index-based products. The implication in such
cases is that the value of greater certainty is not worth the
price.
Given the difficulty of verifying the accuracy of any
disclosed information, the liability regime for fraudulent
information under federal securities law has historically
been construed as extremely far reaching. 73 For example,
to the extent that investors in stock listed on an exchange
or included in indices suffer losses, courts might permit
antifraud claims to proceed against the exchange or index
171. See Order Granting a De Minimis Exception From the Trade-Through
Provisions, Exchange Act Release No. 46,428, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (August 28,
2002) (order exempting transactions in certain ETFs executed at a price that is
no more than three cents lower than the highest bid displayed in CQS and no
more than three cents higher than the lowest offer displayed in CQS from the
trade-through prohibitions of the Intermarket Trading System Plan). In some
cases, greater precision may impair execution opportunities for public
customers, if market professionals may "trade ahead" of their orders on the
pretext of offering negligibly better prices. Request for Comment on the Effects
of Decimal Trading in Subpennies, Exchange Act Release No. 44,568, 66 Fed.
Reg. 38,390 (July 24, 2001).
172. Dow Jones refused to allow licensing of the DJIA until 1997, despite
repeated requests from various futures markets and the CBOT's lawsuit to use
the index without Dow Jones' permission. See MILLERS, supra note 57, at 4.
173. In addition to the specific strict liability regime for public offerings
under the Securities Act and the broad sweep of Rule 10b-5 and related
antifraud rules, there are the significant criminal penalties associated with
willful violations of federal law and the possibility of private enforcement in all
aspects of securities trading. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful"
Mean "Criminal'?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
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provider if investors can allege a profit motive and
aggressive advertising. 174 Such fraud might also arise with
respect to an index, for example, if individuals have
advanced knowledge of a reweighting or change in
composition of the components of the index tainted by
conflicts of interest. Because fraud claims resulting from
the computation of index values could be based on the total
amount of securities or other investment products traded on
the basis of the index, such potential liability could
significantly impact the licensing of indices for use by
financial product sponsors. Relative informational
advantages might also impliedly impose broader duties on
securities market intermediaries. 175
It is not clear how effective contractual disclaimers
would be in the face of federal antifraud rules. Broad
disclaimers of antifraud liability on securities transaction
confirmations may not only be ineffective, but such
disclaimers themselves may be potentially fraudulent to the
extent that they suggest otherwise. Recent attempts at
carving out categories of information have focused on larger
institutions, who are presumed to have the capacity to
waive the application of antifraud rules in light of their
perceived competence to negotiate at arm's length with
market intermediaries. Congress has nevertheless been
reluctant to exempt transactions with even the most
sophisticated investors from securities fraud rules. 176
174. See, e.g., Weissman v. Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc., 468 F.3d 1306,
(11th Cir. 2006), vacated, reh'g en banc granted by No. 04-13575, 2006 WL
4286869 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 2007). In Weissman, the Eleventh Circuit refused to
grant absolute immunity to the NASDAQ Stock Market, as a facility of a self-
regulatory organization, against plaintiffs losses in WorldCom stock because,
"[a]s a private corporation, NASDAQ places advertisements that are patently
intended to increase trading volume and, as a result, company profits .... These
advertisements were in the service of NASDAQ's own business, not the
government's, and such distinctly non-governmental conduct is unprotected by
absolute immunity." Id. at 1312. Increased benchmarking to various index
funds has effectively made index providers the principal "stock pickers" for
many investors, such that public announcements of changes in index
competition might conceivably give rise to similar liability. See Daniel Gross,
The New Industry Standard: Why You Soon May Own Google, SLATE, Aug. 23,
2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2124895/.
175. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1271, 1275 (1995).
176. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3A, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2000)
(not exempting security-based swap agreements from the definition of "security"
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D. Balancing Competition and Consolidation in Market
Structure
The ability to regulate the use of intellectual property
rights in financial markets has served as an important tool
in influencing market structure. 177 If a particular market
has the exclusive right to trade a particular product
(whether as a contractual concession from an issuer or by
regulation), trading is de facto consolidated in a monopoly
market. If neither an issuer nor the market can require a
listed product to trade through the market's facilities, the
potential for competing markets or brokers emerges. In
these cases, the dominance of any one market or firm will
depend, among other things, on the volume of trades it
facilitates, the efficiency of its price discovery process, the
quality of its information and products, and-for our
purposes-the ability to control their use. 178 The right to
exclude others from using proprietary market information
and products may confer a significant advantage in market
share if financial market centers incur a high initial cost of
entry (e.g., to develop intellectual property rights or
superior information creating mechanisms)-such that
there are likely to be few similarly priced substitutes
available179-and incur minimal marginal costs per license
or per trade thereafter. 8 0
and prohibiting only prophylactic measures, and not enforcement action,
against fraud, manipulation, and insider trading with respect thereto).
177. Craig Pirrong, Securities Market Macrostructure: Property Rights and
the Efficiency of Securities Trading, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 385 (2002)
(advocating a system of regulated property rights for addressing market
fragmentation).
178. See, e.g., Mulherin, Netter & Overdahl, supra note 12. See generally
Market Fragmentation Concept Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 23, 2000);
Regulation NMS Adopting Release, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 2, 2005).
179. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 343-49 (6th
ed. 2002); BREYER, supra note 128, at 15.
180. Intellectual property rights and securities markets have historically, if
misleadingly, been characterized as monopolies because of the increasing
positive externalities conferred with each additional user. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
108 (1990) (refuting the characterization of intellectual property as a monopoly);
Simone A. Rose, Patent "Monopolyphobia" A Means of Extinguishing the
Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509 (1999) (arguing that patents should
be viewed as property rights because they do not confer power over price and
thus are not inherently monopolistic). In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink,
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Although regulators can in theory weaken or
strengthen information or other intellectual property rights
in order to promote competition or consolidation,
respectively, there is little academic consensus on whether
the creation of dominant or exclusive markets should be
encouraged or discouraged. Proponents of consolidated
markets point to the difficulties of obtaining execution at
the best available price when customer orders are
distributed among multiple markets, l8 ' the free-riding of
market makers on primary exchange quotations, 8 2 the
redundancy of regulation, and potential gaps in audit trails
and surveillance resulting from allowing multiple
trading. 8 3 Proponents of "fragmented" markets cite the
empirically insignificant negative impact on market
liquidity (at least for actively traded products) and the
positive discipline new entrants can exercise on execution
quality.18 4
Many different financial market structures coexist
today, each reflecting in part the legal regime in which they
operate. Commodity exchanges are often described as
monopoly markets: Each commodity market retains a near
exclusive right to trade its listed instruments due to the
CFTC's policy of discouraging listing of comparable
products on competing exchanges, and the limited
547 U.S. 28, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006), the Supreme Court reversed a longstanding
presumption that patents confer a monopoly per se for purposes of antitrust
analysis. Id. at 1284. The Department of Justice has also addressed the
antitrust consequences of patent scope. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4 (1995),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
181. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Law and
Economics of Best Execution, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 188, 189 (1997)
[hereinafter Macey & O'Hara, Best Execution]; Jonathan Macey & Maureen
O'Hara, From Orders to Markets, 28 REG. 62 (2005); Yakov Amihud & Haim
Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Securities Trading Across
Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1414 (1996).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 36-50.
183. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: COMPETITION
AND MULTIPLE REGULATORS HEIGHTEN CONCERNS ABOUT SELF-REGULATION,
GAO-02-362 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02362.pdf; see
also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure as an Independent Variable in Assessing
Stock Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547 (2003).
184. Boehmer & Boehmer, supra note 93, at 1685; Mark Klock, The SEC's
New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmentation Ahead of
Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 760-61 (1999).
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opportunities for off-board trading l8 5 or settlement of
products listed on a competing contract market. 86 This
regime is reinforced by allocation of financial products
among exchanges and exclusive licensing of underlying
indices.
One claimed benefit of the de facto consolidation in
commodity markets is the strong incentive to share data
and to invest in developing new products. 8 7 Consolidation
strengthens each exchange's property rights by rendering
each market's data the definitive source for information in a
particular product, but does not eliminate competition
among exchanges for comparable products. Because the
availability of quotes and prices for a product is considered
necessary to encourage trading, commodity exchanges have
an incentive to make data available to the public. Thus,
while CFTC regulations require reporting of certain end-of-
day information, 8 8 commodity exchanges have little reason
not to make more real-time information available to the
public. 189
In the market for publicly traded equity securities,
fragmented markets predominate, with exchanges
exhibiting varying degrees of market dominance over their
listed products. In part, the natural fungibility of securities
renders consolidation impracticable; unlike futures and
options, which may require centralized collateral delivery
systems to permit netting of transactions among multiple
counterparties, stocks and other securities are freely
185. 1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION § 2.02, 355-59 (2004). But see infra note 193 (describing certain
over-the-counter derivative transactions in excluded and exempted commodities).
186. See Ann E. Berg, Does the Futures Industry Need Revamping?, 32
FUTURES 62, 64 (2003). Of course, markets may compete with respect to the
design of contracts on similar commodities, though as discussed in the next
section, regulators may be concerned about proliferation of substantially similar
products. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 185, at § 2.03[7], 394-95.
187. Sharon Brown-Hruska & Jerry Ellig, Financial Markets As Information
Monopolies?, REG., Summer 2000, at 29.
188. 17 C.F.R. § 1.32 (2006).
189. Of course, were they "monopoly" markets, the price at which they make
such information available to the market would likely depend on the marginal
impact of higher data fees on revenues from trading, and not the marginal cost
of producing the information. BREYER, supra note 128, at 15-16.
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negotiable in "over-the-counter" transactions. 190 Despite
frequent arguments made in favor of consolidating trading
in securities in designated markets, the Securities Act
Amendments of 1975191 and the Unlisted Trading Privileges
Act of 1994,192 among other legislation, evince a
determination not only to permit, but further to encourage,
multiple listing and trading as well as "over-the-counter"
trading.
Other markets exhibit even greater fragmentation.
"Over-the-counter" derivatives are individually negotiated
bilateral instruments between "eligible contract
participants" that do not require organized trading
platforms. 193 Eligible contract participants and others may
thus enter into unregulated swap transactions based on
underlying individual equity securities, indices, currencies,
interest rates, and other financial instruments.194
Moreover, it appears that such derivatives traders enjoy a
free ride on the use of such underlying instruments or the
use of price information generated by securities or
commodity markets since there is no mechanism by which
to police their use.
In debt markets, the varying terms and relative
illiquidity of debt issues similarly complicate efforts to
organize trading. While trading platforms for debt
instruments bear some of the attributes of exchanges, they
continue to serve primarily as consolidated displays of
190. Exchange rules prohibiting off-board trading of listed stocks (such as
NYSE Rule 390) were routinely evaded by effecting transactions overseas after
market hours. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Group, Rule 410B, available
at http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/ (separately requiring reporting of such trades
for self-regulatory purposes).
191. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
193. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 206(b), 206A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2000
& Supp. 2005), amended by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
(CFMA) § 301, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763-A365, 2763-A449 to A450.
The CFMA effectively permitted qualifying professional investors to opt out of
trading on designated contract markets when entering into individually
negotiated bilateral "swap agreements" or transactions in certain excluded or
exempted commodities by granting such transactions "legal certainty" that off-
board trading restrictions would not apply. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
§§ 206(b), 206A(a).
194. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a).
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inventory by individual dealers, rather than repositories of
active bids and offers. 195 Where trading takes place may
turn largely on which dealer or broker carries a particular
security in inventory, rather than the associated trading
costs. In such markets, the lack of organized markets thus
creates the opportunity for rent-seeking, through higher
markups or markdowns. In recent years, the SEC has
sought to require greater reporting of completed municipal
and corporate debt transactions, 196 but the lack of a
primary debt trading market is likely to preclude further
efforts to consolidate quotations or other market data.
The SEC has used its regulatory authority over
intellectual property rights in market information to
promote competition with dominant markets rather than
pursue consolidation of trading in primary markets. 197 Most
notable among the SEC's market information rules are
those mandating the collection and dissemination of last
sale reports from exchanges and other market centers into
a consolidated tape.198 In addition to last sale data, the SEC
has required registered specialists and market makers as
well as over-the-counter dealers holding themselves out as
195. See, e.g., Website of Thomson Tradeweb LLC, http://www.trade
web.com/page.aspx?file=tradeex&id=10&region=us (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
196. See NASD Rule 6200 Series, http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/
display/display.html?rbid=l189&elementid=1159000635 (last visited Apr. 2,
2007); Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) Rule G-14,
http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/ rules/rulegl4.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
197. The adoption of such limitations of exchanges' intellectual property
rights in market data and market products has proceeded in tandem with the
erosion of other restrictive rules adopted by exchanges to leverage dominant
market share. For example, exchange rules that sought to deter trading away
from primary exchanges have been rescinded under pressure from the SEC. See
NYSE Rule 390 (CCH 1999) (repealed 2000); see also Market Fragmentation
Concept Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 23, 2000). Formal and informal
attempts to "allocate" securities products, such as options on individual stocks,
among exchanges have been challenged by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the SEC. United States v. Am. Stock Exch., No. 1:00-
cv-02174-EGS (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2000) (entry of final judgment prohibiting such
allocation) (on file with Buffalo Law Review). See NASD Says 2 Exchanges Face
Antitrust Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at C3. Joint ventures to pool
inventory exclusively in new trading platforms have run afoul of SEC rules and
antitrust law. See SEC Regulation ATS Rule 300, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2006);
see also Steven Vames, SEC's BrokerTec Probe Puts Model to the Test, WALL ST.
J., May 22, 2002, at C15.
198. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.601-.602 (2006).
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market makers to ensure that their quotations are
available and accessible by retail brokers, which are then
consolidated with data from other market centers. To
minimize free-riding on such quotes, the Commission has
considered various approaches to limiting the ability of
market-makers to match the national best bid and offer
without routing orders to the quoting exchange, such as by
disclosure of execution quality and order routing
practices, 199 efforts at price protection for publicly quoted
limit orders, 200 and a proposal to require internalized order
to improve upon quoted prices. 201
More recently, the Commission has been confronted
with attempts by exchanges to impose licensing terms that
are designed literally to shove their competition off the
screen. Exchange rules have been proposed that would
prohibit commingling of a given market center's data with
the data gathered from other market centers or would
require special attribution of a particular market center
(thus limiting screen space for other market centers on a
quotation montage). 20 2 In such situations, the Commission
has relied on its authority to approve or disapprove of rules
of self-regulatory organizations to determine when licensing
terms are fair and reasonable. Where such authority does
not exist, such as in the case of private trading systems, the
Commission has been more aggressive in articulating
principles of "fair access" up front. 20 3
199. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.605-.606 (2006).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2006).
201. Market Fragmentation Concept Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577.
202. Order Approving NYSE Rule Changes Relating to Real-Time
OpenBook Service, Exchange Act Release No. 53,585, 2006 WL 2794627 (Mar.
31, 2006) (approving proposed modifications to vendor display contract terms
for OpenBook that "allow market data vendors to provide their subscribers with
useful data without imposing unnecessary restrictions . . . ."); Order Approving
NYSE Rule Change Relating to Fees for OpenBook, Exchange Act Release No.
45,138, 66 Fed. Reg. 64,895 (Dec. 14, 2001) (approving NYSE's proposed
OpenBook data product).
203. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange
Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, at 70,915 (Dec. 22, 1998) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242, and 249) [hereinafter Regulation ATS Adopting
Release] (discussing fair access requirements).
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E. Managing Proliferation of Products
Despite the potential benefits of competition in market
structure, regulators may use intellectual property rights to
discourage the proliferation of financial instruments,
markets, products, and standards when they reduce
liquidity and facilitate price manipulation. Even while
espousing competition, regulators may nevertheless feel
more secure in their oversight over order flow, quotations,
and trade reports are funneled through a few tightly
regulated exchanges, rather than a large number of more
loosely regulated brokerage houses. Regulators may
similarly prefer to concentrate trading in a few, highly
liquid instruments, rather than disperse scant "liquidity"
among multiple markets and products that may have
limited, long-term appeal. 20 4 Broad competition in the
development of credit ratings, order audit trails, index
weighting methodologies, order types, and other
innovations present myriad unforeseen regulatory problems
that could give regulators pause.205
Because it is difficult for regulators to implement such
restrictions formally in administrative law without erecting
untenable obstacles for new entrants, intellectual property
rights provide a convenient foil for publicly advocating
competition while facilitating consolidation of trading in a
handful of markets or a few dominant instruments. Much of
the commentary favoring strong property right protections
in financial markets assumes both that the field of
invention is unlimited and that unlimited innovation is
beneficial to investors. 206 For example, the Seventh Circuit
204. See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, Growth of Hot Investment Tool Slowed by
Bureaucratic Backlog, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2006, at Al (suggesting that the
backlog of applications for ETFs to be reviewed by the SEC's Division of
Investment Management may, in part, limit the rapid expansion and
contraction of a "fad" product).
205. For example, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, requires the Commission to act within a specified time
period on applications by credit rating agencies for registration as a "nationally
recognized statistical rating organization," in contrast to the Commission's
current process of making such determinations through the no-action process.
Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange
Act Release No. 8,570, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (Apr. 25, 2005).
206. See, e.g., William L. Silber, Innovation, Competition, and New Contract
Design in Futures Markets, 1 J. FUTURES MARKETS 123 (1981). Thus, for
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justified protection of property rights in market indices as
necessary not to discourage the (significant) effort required
to "stimulate creation of new indices. '20 7 The CFTC, for
example, has never expressly prohibited the listing of
competing contracts, although it has on occasion required
changes in terms to reduce the level of direct competition. 208
The SEC has also repeatedly endorsed competition among
options exchanges and options in individual stocks and
stock indices. 209
The scope of recognized rights in established products,
however, affects the degree of proliferation possible. The
broader the level of abstraction at which the right is
defined, the greater the power of the owner to preempt the
introduction of competing products. 210 It could be argued,
for example, that strong intellectual property protection for
indices has helped contain competition among commodity
and options exchanges. From a legal perspective, indices
must be broad-based to make futures contracts tradable on
CFTC-regulated markets,211 and only a handful of indexing
example, the Seventh Circuit, in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co.,
asserted that protecting Dow Jones' right to exclude others from trading
derivatives on the Dow Jones Industrial Average without its consent did not
harm the investing public because an "infinite number of stock market indexes"
may be created by its competitors. 456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ill. 1983).
207. Board of Trade of Chicago, 456 N.E.2d at 89; see also Harris, supra
note 86, at 190-92; Mulherin, Netter & Overdahl, supra note 12, at 638; Richard
L. Sandor, Innovations by an Exchange: A Case Study of the Development of the
Plywood Futures Contract, 16 J.L. & ECON. 119 (1973); Silber, supra note 206,
at 125-45.
208. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 185, § 2.03[7] at 394-95.
209. See Competitive Developments in the Options Market, 69 Fed. Reg.
6,124, at 6,124-26 (Feb. 9, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter
Options Concept Release].
210. See, e.g., Lunney supra note 11, at 495, 513; Reichman, supra note 9, at
2452. For intellectual property protected by copyright, the breadth of the right
hinges upon the level of abstraction at which potential infringers appropriate
merely the "idea," and not the "expression," of the protected work. For those
protected by trademark rights, misappropriation hinges upon the potential for
confusion or deception.
211. Prior to the CFMA, a stock index had to be representative of a
"substantial segment" of the market for the associated index future to be listed
on a commodity exchange. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713
(7th Cir. 1999) (concluding, over the SEC's objection, that futures contracts
could be listed on the Dow Jones Utilities and Transportation Averages,
because they reflected the market performance of industries that themselves
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methodologies are commonly used for products where active
arbitrage among cash, options, and futures markets is
expected. 212 Practically, index providers must balance the
index's representativeness of the market against the ease
with which traders can track or replicate the index using
the individual components. To the extent that indices are
often used because of the perceived benefits of
diversification, successful indices should be representative
of a broader "market portfolio. ' 213 The cost of replicating (or
hedging) an index, by contrast, may turn on the number
and liquidity of component securities that need to be
maintained in an equivalent cash portfolio. 214 Many index-
tracking funds may contain only the component stocks with
the highest capitalization to avoid trading and liquidity
costs for smaller-cap securities. 215
The increased role of index benchmarking, moreover,
has established a handful of indices as the market standard
for quality of return. The rise of portfolio theory and basic
financial models of expected risk premia rely on the
expected return of an optimal market portfolio, which in
turn are frequently estimated based on the top three
indices-the S&P 500, the DJIA, and the Nasdaq-100. 216
represented a substantial segment of the market). Today, futures contracts on
indices with an insufficient number of component securities may be designated
as "security futures products" subject to joint SEC-CFTC oversight. See supra
note 195.
212. See supra note 86. Indexing methods incorporate rules for substitution
of stocks, adjustments for dividends and other extraordinary events, and other
rules designed to keep the index current while ensuring price continuity.
213. HARRIS, supra note 62, at 442.
214. See Ajay Shah & Susan Thomas, Market Microstructure Considerations
in Index Construction (1998) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=79708; see also Kim, Szakmary & Schwartz, supra note
59, at 495-97 (finding that the Major Market Index "consistently leads the S&P
500 and NYSE" Composite Indices in the cash market, but that the S&P 500
leads the NYSE Composite and MMI in the futures markets, and attributing
the former to the lower transaction costs of the MMI in cash markets due to the
lower transaction costs in the large-capitalization stocks in the MMI).
215. See generally Robert Neal, Is Program Trading Destabilizing?, 1 J.
DERIVATIVES 64 (1993).
216. Other commonly used indices include the Russell 2000 and the
Wilshire 5000 for U.S. equity securities, the Lehman Bros. Bond Index, and
various Financial Times indices. See, e.g., Nasdaq Website, Index Descriptions,




Accordingly, these three indices tend to dominate trading in
index-based products, and securities included in these
indices have been alleged to experience a reputational
benefit, if not demonstrable appreciation in share price. 217
Successful new indices can emerge, such as the Nasdaq-100
in 1985, that tap into new markets. Index funds that
merely seek to tinker with component counts (e.g., "500"),
sector allocations, or substantial components of an index,
might however, be viewed as infringing upon the providers'
proprietary rights.218
Protection of derivative works may give dominant index
providers further control over complementary sector
indices. Many established indices have introduced sector-
specific or capitalization-specific indices drawing from the
components of the flagship index. These indices may then
crowd out other, more representative sector or
capitalization indices. For industry sectors with a smaller
set of publicly traded companies, there will often be little
difference among the principal components of the index: in
these situations, as discussed above, owners of existing
sector indices have attempted to sue owners of newer
indices because of the substantial overlap in their index
products.219
F. Controlling Payment Flows
The Commission has tinkered with information rights
not only in circumstances where regulatory action is
thought necessary to address such market failures, but also
to address a variety of additional objectives, such as to
ensure funding of self-regulatory operations and improve
marketwide execution quality. As discussed above, the
Commission has granted SROs the power and obligation to
collect, process, and disseminate the top tier of market
information, subject to certain minimum public display and
access requirements described above and with revenues
217. See Chris Brooks, Konstantina Kappou & Charles Ward, Gambling on
the S&P 500's Gold Seal: New Evidence on the Index Effect 27 (2004)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=496682.
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largely allocated to compensate for their self-regulatory
oversight. 220 Consistent with this formula, the Commission
has limited the ability of market centers other than SROs
to exploit a proprietary interest in their market
information.221 Fees for depth-of-book information, by
contrast, are subject only to review for reasonableness, in
the case of SROs, and are largely outside the Commission's
jurisdiction for other trading venues.222
In addition to affirmative licensing arrangements,
however, many revenue sharing arrangements exist that
reflect, to a degree, transactions in various forms of market
information. For example, while market quotes and prices
have historically deemed to belong to the exchange, a
number of parties contribute to price formation, including
retail investors and institutional investors who generate
priced and unpriced orders, whether on an informed or
uninformed basis; brokers who collect and route such orders
to the "best" market for execution; and market makers and
specialists who set prices based on the aggregate trading
information they collect. All of these parties, moreover, are
consumers to varying degrees of the information generated
through the price formation cycle.
As a result, exchanges and other market centers who
"own" the data have sought to share data revenues with the
various parties in the chain of production. Alternative
trading systems have offered "liquidity rebates" to investors
and traders who submit priced orders that create liquidity
within their systems. 223 Exchanges and the NASD have
shared tape revenue with their members based on the
volume of transactions they reported through their
220. See Market Data Concept Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, at 70,619-20.
As discussed below in Part III.B, the Commission has not definitively addressed
the manner in which such data should be priced, which has led to the charge
that exchanges charge excessive rents relative to the cost of producing such
information. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
221. See Market Data Concept Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613. At one point,
the SEC sought comment as to the feasibility of developing a cost-plus formula
for valuing exchange data. See id.
222. See infra Part III.B.




facilities. 224 Market makers have paid retail brokers for the
aggregate market sentiment expressed in their retail
customers' "order flow. '225
Likewise, the SEC has questioned the appropriateness
of "payment for order flow" arrangements with third-party
market makers when retail brokers do not pass along the
economic benefits of such contracts to the retail investor in
the form of lower commission rates. Concerns about
payment for order flow are generally based on the
possibility that the broker routes orders to a market center
that pays for order flow knowing that its customer will
receive a poorer execution than in a market center with
potentially better execution opportunities. 226  The
informational advantage such market centers receive,
however, is a distinct benefit for which compensation may
be plausibly appropriate, just as "integrated" firms with
both retail and market making operations may profit from
"internalization" of retail orders; 227 indeed, the Commission
has "blessed" certain payment for order flow rules adopted
by exchanges for similar purposes.228
The Commission has also restricted revenue sharing
arrangements that have the potential to interfere with the
quotation display and access mechanisms for intermarket
trading. Certain alternative trading systems have
attempted to distinguish "liquidity providers" (customers
who submit orders with a limit price that signals their
reservation price) from "liquidity takers" (customers who
224. The Commission used its authority under § 19(b)(3)(c) of the Act to
abrogate several such rules pending negotiations over the new allocation
formula for revenues from the sale of quotation information. See Order of
Summary Abrogation, Exchange Act Release No. 46,159, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,775
(July 10, 2002); infra note 285.
225. Market Fragmentation Concept Release, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, at
10,577-80 (Feb. 23, 2000).
226. Even here, the SEC does not always take into account associated
transaction costs of finding such markets. Macey & O'Hara, Best Execution,
supra note 181, at 188.
227. See Francis J. Facciolo, A Broker's Duty of Best Execution in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 26 PACE L. REV. 155, 170, 179 (2005); see
also Fleckner, supra note 6; Aaron Lucchette, Brokers Worry When Trading
Fees are Just the Start, WALL ST. J., Jan 16, 2006, at C1.
228. See Options Concept Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 6,124, at 6,128 (Feb. 9,
2004).
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hit posted limit orders without revealing their reservation
price) when setting fee schedules. In theory, compensating
liquidity providers for the "free information" they provide
the market would appear justified. 229 Nevertheless, the
Commission has viewed such differential pricing as
quotation distortion because other market participants may
be required, in an automated marketplace, to route orders
to such a market center, 230 even if their "all-in" cost (after
including transaction costs) might exceed the price they
would have obtained had they routed their order to a
market center displaying an ostensibly inferior price.231
229. The Commission has recognized the value of this "free option." See
Regulation NMS Proposing Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, at 11,136 (Mar. 9,
2004).
230. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(4) (permitting SROs to regulate such fees).
These Commission interventions were meant to facilitate the interaction of
orders displayed by alternative trading systems with market maker quotations
in Nasdaq pursuant to the requirement that alternative trading systems
publicly display and provide execution access to their best-priced customer
orders through the facilities of an SRO. Regulation ATS Rule 301(b)(6), 17
C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(6) (2006). Prior to Nasdaq's separation from the NASD and
operation as an independent national securities exchange, the NASD, pursuant
to its authority under Rule 301(b)(6), capped the fees that alternative trading
systems and other market centers could charge for such public access to their
quotes through Nasdaq's order display and execution facilities at $0.003 per
share. See NASD Rule 4623(b)(6) (CCH Jan. 2005). As a result of the completed
spin-off of Nasdaq, the NASD permits alternative trading systems to satisfy the
public display requirement through its Alternative Display Facility, provided,
inter alia, that each system provide "a level and cost of access to its quotations
in an NMS stock displayed in the ADF that is substantially equivalent to the
level and cost of access to quotations displayed by SRO trading facilities in that
NMS stock." Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual: Rule 4300A(a)(3) (CCH
2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?
rbid=l189&elementid=159000759. Nasdaq, as an independent SRO, no
longer permits alternative trading systems to satisfy their obligations under
Regulation ATS Rule 301(b)(6) unless they accept automated executions (at no
additional charge). Nasdaq Rule 4623(b), http://nasdaq.complinet.com/
nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&elementid=1063 (last visited Apr. 14,
2007).
231. For example, execution of a non-subscriber's buy order at $10.05/share
through an alternative trading system-though presumably the "best price"
available in the market at a given time-may require the purchaser to pay
$10.06/share if the alternative trading system charges the liquidity taker a
penny per share for execution. Here, the potential distortion to published "top-
of-book" quotes-and consequently, the perceived unfairness of requiring others
to internalize orders by reference to such "top-of-book" quotes-is invoked to
require all such fees to be incorporated into publicly quoted prices. The
inability to charge different fees to different customers effectively precludes
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By contrast, the Commission has not taken steps to
foster or prohibit revenue sharing arrangements for other
types of securities information despite the uncertainties
created by state law property regimes and the potential
disincentives to ensure the timely and accurate provision of
such information. In the context of market indices, the SEC
has taken little to no action to regulate the economic value
of index values, even though they perform a function that
bears some similarities to the role of exchanges in
processing market information. While indices may be
formally entitled to intellectual property protection because
of the "selection" of component securities and weighting
methodology, index providers have defended their property
right in part on the substantial labor entailed in generating
real-time index values from publicly available market
prices. 232 In some respects, greater intervention may be
warranted to the extent that the rulings in the Archipelago
and the ISE Cases have impaired the right of index
providers to control downstream resales of index-based
products. Absent regulatory intervention, index licensing
practices may be revised to require lump sum fees up front,
in lieu of "metering" usage of index-related products to
cover the costs of real-time calculation or dissemination
systems. 233
G. Overseeing Modification and Governance
The Commission has also played a significant role in
the ongoing supervision of owners of market information
and standards. Regulatory intervention in the ownership
and control of standards has been the subject of extended
potentially beneficial price discrimination among liquidity providers and takers.
As the Commission demands greater granularity of information, even the
smallest of volume-based fees can result in price distortion.
232. See supra note 189. While Congress has granted the Commission the
authority to regulate "securities information processors" other than those
affiliated with a self-regulatory organization, see 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(b) (2000),
the Commission has declined to use that authority beyond regulation of end-
user displays. See Vendor Display Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.603 (2006).
233. See supra note 63; cf. Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After
Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 263,
286-289 (1994) (critiquing argument that tie-ins "can be a procompetitive form
of price discrimination when the seller uses the sale of the tied product to
impose a variable charge based upon the intensity of use of the tying product").
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discussion in numerous industries, including
telecommunications and software development. In each,
regulators must weigh whether uniform standards are
inevitable or desirable, and if so, to opine how uniform or
competing standards should be structured. The desire to
promote robust standards and to preserve a meaningful role
for all industry participants through regulation must then
be weighed against the traditional causes of regulatory
failure. 234 As discussed above, the Commission has sought
to work with trade associations, other non-governmental
bodies, 235 advisory committees, or periodic roundtable
gatherings 23 6 that own or administer standards to address
this problem. In some instances, Congressional oversight
has been thought to add a measure of protection, 237
although that oversight is subject to the same failings as
regulation.238 In others, the SEC is given formal authority
to veto or modify standards, often as a bargaining tool to
extract concessions. 239 In others, the SEC merely ratifies
the use of particular standards by acknowledging their
234. See Friedman, supra note 111, at 1123; see also Lao, supra note 16, at
1680-87; Lemley & McGowan, supra note 139, at 484, 544-49 (1998).
235. See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, COSO Section 404 Guidance Aligns
Companies, Auditors on Internal Controls, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1247 (BNA
2006) (describing how COSO's guidance will complement the SEC's guidance in
helping public companies meet Section 404 requirements).
236. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language, Deals, and
Standards: The Future of XML Contracts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 359-61
(2006) (suggesting the creation of a KXML Board to manage the creation and
maintenance of an extensible markup language (XML) protocol for financial and
nonfinancial disclosures).
237. See, e.g., Promoting Transparency in Financial Reporting Act of 2006,
H.R. 5024, 109th Cong. (2006). This Act would enhance financial reporting
transparency by requiring the SEC and FASB to provide testimony on their
respective efforts to reduce the complexity of public companies' financial
reporting documents.
238. See ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT
WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 106-09 (2002)
(describing SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt's attempts to require options
expensing).
239. See generally Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)-(b)
(2000) (oversight of financial accounting); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(c),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000) (oversight of SRO rules).
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preeminence tacitly in its rulemaking and interpretive
functions.240
The determination whether to "make-or-buy"
standards, like any other good or service, is driven by
factors such as cost, expertise, and the likely restrictions
imposed by administrative process.241 "Outsourcing" the
standard-setting process could result in opportunistic
behavior by private standard-setting bodies (e.g., favoring
standards owned by the standard-setter or blocking
competing standards), incompleteness of standards
designed to decrease the enforcement risk of
noncompliance, and the ability to "hold-up" the
promulgation of new standards. 242
In the context of public company disclosure, scores of
academics and practitioners have criticized the
Commission's mandatory disclosure system and have
advocated the use of competing standards, on the theory
that competition will produce optimal levels of disclosure. 243
While much is made of the benefits from the ease of
understanding and use for investors of common
standards, 244  some scholars have downplayed the
240. For example, the CUSIP system is controlled by the CUSIP Board of
Trustees, under the auspices of the American Bankers Association, which
awarded Standard & Poors the contract to perform the CUSIP service functions.
See CUSIP Service Bureau, http://www.cusip.com/static/html/CUSIPaccess/
whats.html (last visited July 20, 2006). While neither Congress nor the SEC has
exercised regulatory authority over either the CUSIP Board or Standard &
Poor's in this capacity, they have "endorsed" the exclusive use of the CUSIP
system throughout the federal securities laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)
(2000) (requiring certain reports by institutional investment managers to
contain CUSIP numbers of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-19(a)(5) (2004)
(defining "CUSIP number" in written procedures for transfer agents); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-3(b)(4)(iv) (2005) (records of hold-in-custody repurchase agreements
to include CUSIP numbers); MSRB Rule G-34, http://www.msrb.org/
msrb1/rules/ruleg34.htm (requiring municipal issuers to apply for a CUSIP
number).
241. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J.
389, 390 (2003).
242. Id. at 391-95.
243. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws,
International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1855 (1997); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999); Mahoney, supra note 141.
244. Coffee, supra note 20, at 728-30.
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significance of the positive externalities hypothesized in
such "network effects" analyses, where no common
technological network is necessary and network benefits
accrue primarily in the form of "positive feedback" rather
than ensuring that all market participants are wired to the
same infrastructure. 245 The Commission has also conceded,
to a degree, the adequacy of competing international
disclosure standards in various contexts. 246
The requirement of a single standard or limited number
of standards may also be driven by policy goals unrelated to
promoting uniformity or interoperability. Standards for
quotation display and dissemination, for example, may
have more to do with the SEC's interest in enforcing a strict
interpretation of the "best execution" rule than in
facilitating the efficient execution of securities transactions.
This is most apparent when SEC rules mandate physical
connectivity among markets or uniform protocols among
market participants, despite the relative ease of arbitrage
across markets by end users.247  Such standards may
impede, for example, the interoperability of new entrants
with more advanced technologies.
If multiple private standards are permitted to co-exist,
the agency's role becomes less substantive and more
procedural-to guide the development of standards, the
relationship among different standards, and the governance
245. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 139, at 491-96. In the antitrust
jurisprudence of "essential facilities," courts and commentators have struggled
to limit the situations in which market dominant entities become subject to a
"duty to deal" with competitors due to a perceived need to participate in an
industry utility. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in
Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990).
246. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2006) (permitting home country reporting for
foreign private issuers whose securities are not listed on a U.S. exchange);
International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 7,745, 64 Fed.
Reg. 53,900 (Oct. 5, 1999) (adopting international non-financial disclosure
standards for foreign private issuers).
247. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 139, at 497-98 (presence of
intermediaries to facilitate transition between standards may mitigate the
potential friction). While disparities in prices quoted across markets will occur,
persisting differential spreads may well be the result of collusion (rather than
the lack of hardwired linkages). See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE
NASDAQ MARKET, available at http://www.sec.govflitigation/investreport/34-
51163.htm (1996).
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of standard-setting bodies. Even in such areas, the case for
active regulatory involvement is not straightforward. For
example, when standard-setting is driven by
anticompetitive motives-e.g., locking participants into a
particular standard by refusing to license the standard or
make it interoperable with competing standards-there is a
compelling case for intervention.248
In other cases, friction within or among standard-
setting bodies may be resolved without government
interference if standard-setters are able and willing to
coordinate their efforts. For example, SRO member conduct
rules suffer from significant redundancy and inconsistency,
but through a combination of inter-SRO agreements and
SEC encouragement, it is conceivable that those differences
may be resolved without formal merger. 249  At the
international level, the SEC has made modest strides
toward embracing non-U.S. GAAP accounting standards
(such as IAS). 250
Oversight of the governance of standards is another
area where regulatory involvement may yield beneficial
248. The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Credit Suisse First
Boston v. Billing, 426 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 U.S. 762,
(2006), cert. vacated and granted, No. 05-1157, 2007 WL 789065, 75 USLW 3497
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2007), on the question "[wihether, in a private damages action
under the antitrust laws[,J . . . the standard for implying antitrust immunity is
the potential for conflict with the securities laws or ... a specific expression of
congressional intent to immunize such conduct and a showing that the SEC has
power to compel the specific practices at issue." Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Credit Suisse First Boston v. Billing, No. 05-1157, 2006 WL 616006 (filed Mar.
8, 2006). Depending on the outcome of this case, the SEC may find it
advantageous to yield regulation of coordinated standard-setting activity to
antitrust regulators in circumstances where it lacks the institutional
competence to make appropriate determinations of the economic impact of
certain market practices. See infra note 319-20 and accompanying text.
249. See Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, NASD, NYSE Agree to Merge
Some Oversight, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 29, 2006, at Cl; Christopher Cox, Chairman,
SEC, Remarks to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association:
More Efficient and Effective Regulation In the Era of Global Consolidation of
Markets (Nov. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl
2006/spchlll006cc.htm (referring to and endorsing efforts to "fold the member
regulation functions of both the NASD and the NYSE into one regulatory
body").
250. International Disclosure Standards, International Series Release No.
1,205, Exchange Act Release Nos. 7,745, 41,936, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,900, at 53,900-
01 (Oct. 5, 1999).
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results. Private, unregulated development of standards may
result in sub-optimal choice of provisions, if market
participants latch onto an inchoate standard to minimize
learning costs and then avoid migrating to avoid switching
costs. 251 For example, underwriters and law firms may
settle upon standard language for debt covenants, even
before their utility has been tested in court, simply to avoid
the time and effort of developing and then marketing
alternative provisions.252  Once interests become
entrenched, efforts to revise or replace established
standards run into significant industry opposition.
Moreover, self-regulatory organizations and industry
associations that own standards might omit or delay
provisions in standards that would impair their members'
profitability. 253
III. STRATEGIES FOR REGULATORY INTERVENTION
How the Commission implements its information
rights policy is as important as its policy goals. With respect
to corporate disclosures, the Commission's authority is
fairly straightforward, given the express mandate of § 13 of
the Exchange Act to require reporting companies to "file
... such information and documents... as the Commission
shall require. ' 254 Criticism is often inveighed against the
desirability of such policy, or the attendant costs and
benefits, but rarely the Commission's statutory authority. 255
251. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 116, at 730; RAO, supra note 12, at
56-59. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in
the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986); Michael L.
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75
Am. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
252. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 116, at 736.
253. See, e.g., Notice to Members from NASD, Corporate Debt Securities 06-
22, http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/notice-to-members/
nasdw_016573.pdf (May 2006) (proposing to add identifiers to transaction
reports in corporate debt securities to distinguish inter-dealer transactions from
dealer-customer transactions in order to highlight the markups charged to
customers).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000).
255. This Article does not address the limited constitutional defenses in
regulating commercial information. For example, despite arguments that forced
disclosures are "compelled speech" prohibited by the First Amendment, courts
have ruled that such commercial information may be regulated. See Blount v.
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With respect to other types of information, more serious
disputes have emerged. Exchanges, for example, sought to
challenge the Commission's authority to require compulsory
publication of trade reports, 256 before Congress gave the
Commission authority under the national market system
provisions of the Exchange Act to oversee the manner in
which SROs and their members "collect, process, distribute
[and] publish" market information. 257 As the Commission
further elaborates its national market agenda, questions
continue to arise as to whether the Commission has
exceeded this statutory mandate. 258
More generally, when Commission policy seeks to
transcend mere issues of disclosure, and regulate the
economics of transactions in securities information and
other intellectual property, the Commission must often rely
on more creative regulatory approaches to achieve its
rulemaking objectives, such as the exercise of oversight over
SRO fees or access, or the timing of regulatory approvals.
Ironically, it may well be the lack of flexibility to regulate
market participants' activity-for example, with respect to
fees or terms of access-that leads the Commission to
continue to adopt blunter approaches to regulation, such as
implied preemption of state law rights or, conversely,
noninterference in the licensing of indices.
SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 949 (1995) (holding that "pay-to-play" rules, adopted by the
MSRB and approved by the Commission, restricting contributions to state
political campaigns and solicitations thereof by municipal securities
professionals, did not violate First and Tenth Amendment); SEC v. Fin. News
Assocs., No. 84-0878-A, 1985 WL 25023, at *14 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 1985)
(upholding SEC's order under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 enjoining
defendant from publishing investment advisory material).
256. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 504-08 (discussing the objections
of the NYSE to SEC Rules 17a-14 and 17a-15 requiring the publication of
quotations and dissemination of a consolidated tape for trade reports in
reported securities, the predecessors to NMS Rules 601 and 602, 17 C.F.R. §
242.601-.602).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(c) (2000).
258. See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look
at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 884-85 (1981). See
generally Dale A. Oesterle, Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded its
Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a "National Market System" in Securities
Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 613 (2005).
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A. Implied Preemption
In the absence of express authority to compel
disclosure, an argument can often be made that state
intellectual property rights are impliedly preempted by
federal securities law. As discussed above, state law
intellectual property rights have been preempted to a
degree by federal intellectual property law. When Congress
has "struck the balance" between private incentives and
public access, states are not permitted to "second-guess"
Congress' judgment by affording greater protection under
state law.259 Even when specific rights under state law
would not be protectable under federal copyright or patent
law, such as information or utilitarian design concepts,
such rights may be preempted if they fall within the "broad
scope" of protectable "subject matter. '260
Federal securities law also contains extensive examples
of express and implied preemption, largely motivated by the
desire to allow the SEC to dictate the scope of limits of
securities regulation and eliminate duplicative and
potentially inconsistent state regulation. Amendments to
the federal securities laws adopted in 1996 as part of the
Capital Market Efficiency Act 26 1 preempt state rules and
regulations governing public offerings and offering
documents, even when such securities or securities are
themselves exempt from federal registration.262 Certain
state law securities fraud class actions were also precluded
259. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft, 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (patent
law); Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (copyright).
260. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 155 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)) (distinguishing state law protection of trade secrets
from state law protection for unpatented items in the public domain); W.T.
Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (protecting state law trade
dress claims).
261. Capital Markets Efficiency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000) (preempting any state law, rule, regulation,
order, or other administrative action with respect to "covered securities," the
"registration or qualification of securities, or ... securities transactions," the
use of "any offering document, . . .proxy statement, report to shareholders, or
other disclosure document" other than incorporation documents, or merit-based
prohibitions, limitations or conditions on their offer or sale).
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by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,263 even
when the underlying cause of action is not actionable under
federal securities law.264 The Exchange Act has also been
read not only expressly to preempt antitrust law when
Congress has instructed the Commission to adopt rules to
address a particular practice, 265 but also impliedly to
preempt antitrust enforcement if there exists the mere
potential for SEC rulemaking in a particular sphere of
securities regulation.266
The Commission has occasionally asserted such
preemptive power with respect to state intellectual
property. For example, the Commission has suggested that
the power to require consolidated dissemination of market
information impliedly preempts assertion of individual
rights therein:
This question presumes, however, that essentially state law
concepts of ownership prevail in this area. In fact, market
information, at least since 1975, has been subject to
comprehensive regulation under the Exchange Act, particularly
the national market system requirements of Section 11A. To
implement the national market system, the Commission has
required the SROs to act jointly pursuant to various national
market system plans in disseminating consolidated market
information.
The plans also govern two of the most important rights of
ownership of the information-the fees that can be charged and
263. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-353, § 101(b)(1)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)).
264. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 126 S.
Ct. 1503, 1506, 1515 (2006) (holding that a state securities fraud class action on
behalf of long-term "holders" of a security was precluded by Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, even though the plaintiffs would not
meet the "purchaser or seller" standing requirement for a Rule 10b-5 class
action).
265. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975);
Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963);
In re Stock Exchanges Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.
2003); Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, 313 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2002); see also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L.
607 (2003).
266. See, e.g., Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d
Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 U.S. 762, (2006), cert. vacated and granted, No. 05-
1157, 2007 WL 789065, 75 USLW 3497 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2007).
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the distribution of revenues derived from those fees. As a
consequence, no single market can be said to fully "own" the
stream of consolidated information that is made available to the
public. Although markets and others may assert a proprietary
interest in the information that they contribute to this stream, the
practical effect of comprehensive federal regulation of market
information is that proprietary interests in this information are
subordinated to the Exchange Act's objectives for a national
market system.267
This argument would presumably be extended even to those
market participants who do not share in consolidated
market revenues. To a degree, this structure is motivated
by the need to fund SROs. 268 On the other hand, the
inability to regulate the fee structure of and access to non-
SRO markets might have led the Commission to foreclose
such markets from selling substantively similar market
information until Regulation ATS extended similar
requirements to other trading venues.
While preemption of state or federal intellectual
property rights may be a useful strategy for achieving
regulatory objectives, it "lacks nuance. ' 269 In Nasdaq v.
Archipelago,270 for example, the district court rejected the
argument that the Exchange Act's national market system
authority preempted Nasdaq's proprietary interest in the
Nasdaq-100 index. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on
the Commission's own amicus brief, which argued that no
conflict of interest existed between protecting the
267. Market Data Concept Release, 64 Fed. Reg. 70,613, at 70,615 (Dec. 17,
1999).
268. See Listing and Trading of Affiliated Securities by a Self-Regulatory
Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126 (Dec. 8,
2004); see also Letter from Mark E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry
Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, Mar. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.sia.com/2005 commentletters/5218.pdf (advocating the use of
membership and regulatory fees to fund self-regulation rather than subsidies
from the sale of market data).
269. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of
Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 136-37 (1999); see also
Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and
Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 83,
132 (2006); Samuel M. Bayard, Chihuahuas, Seventh Circuit Judges, and Movie
Scripts, Oh My!: Copyright Preemption of Contracts to Protect Ideas, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 603, 643 (2001).
270. 336 F. Supp. 2d 294, 301-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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commercial value of indices by charging licensing fees for
their use and the objectives of the Unlisted Trading
Privileges Act in permitting unlisted trading of listed
securities by competing exchanges.271 Such "all-or-nothing"
regulation of information rights might thus result in
underregulation as well as overregulation.
B. Compulsory Licensing and Rate Regulation
Another commonly advocated approach for balancing
the competing objectives of intellectual property law is
compulsory licensing. Widely used for regulating natural
monopolies, compulsory licensing systems have been
extended to the licensing of intellectual property. Thus, in
the field of copyright, compulsory licensing is mandated for
certain works, such as cable, sound recordings, public
broadcasts, and satellite transmissions. 272  While
historically license fees have been set by regulatory bodies,
modern compulsory licensing schemes may rely on private
negotiations among intellectual property owners (pursuant
to an exemption from antitrust law), backstopped by
arbitration or regulatory action.273
In the absence of a statutory scheme, various agencies
have sought to create compulsory licensing systems through
enforcement mechanisms, either by settlement decrees or
by judicial order. 274 The SEC has, in the context of
wholesale market data transactions, traditionally sought to
establish some control over rate-setting on two footings.
First, the SEC has the authority to disapprove rules that do
271. Id. (referring to the amicus brief of SEC).
272. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 118, 119 (2000).
273. See Reichman, supra note 9, at 2523-24.
274. The Justice Department monitors the rates charged for licensing music
pursuant to consent decrees negotiated with American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers and Broadcast Music, Inc. See, e.g., United States v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. 71,378 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United
States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United
States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v.
Broadcast Music, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,096 (E.D. Wisc. 1941). The
Federal Communications Commission has entered into consent decrees with
common carriers regarding access to telecommunications networks. See, e.g.,
Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002); Lemley & McGowan, supra note 139, at
541.
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not comply with the Exchange Act's statutory requirement
that exchanges provide for the "equitable allocation of
reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its
members and issuers and other persons using its
facilities. ' 275 The SEC also has authority to "to authorize or
require self-regulatory organizations to act jointly with
respect to matters as to which they share authority under
this chapter in planning, developing, operating, or
regulating a national market system. ' 276
Because neither provision confers upon the Commission
express authority to engage in ratemaking, Commission
action has historically consisted of negotiation among SROs
in the shadow of its plenary authority. Commission rules,
for example, require self-regulatory organizations to collect
top-of-book information, consolidate the information across
markets through the use of an exclusive securities
information processor, and disseminate the data to the
public. Since SRO rates must be approved by the
Commission, any increase in rates must be negotiated with
the Commission. In disputes between SROs and non-SROs
with respect to approved rules, however, the Commission
can be no more than a passive intervenor in judicial
proceedings. 277
Perhaps the most significant issue in Commission
ratesetting efforts is the lack of any statutory metric by
which to determine what rates are appropriate and how
rates should be allocated. 278 Ratemaking may proceed in a
number of ways: cost-plus approaches seek to determine the
cost of providing a service and then to add a reasonable rate
275. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(5) (2000)
(requiring the rules of a national securities association to "provide for the
equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among members
and issuers and other persons using any facility or system which the association
operates or controls").
276. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(3)(B).
277. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 801 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
278. By contrast, Congress has expressly provided a cost-basis mechanism
for the computation of the aggregate amount of fees to support the creation of
accounting and auditing standards under Sarbanes-Oxley. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 § 109, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7219 (2005))
(providing that each funded standard-setting board shall establish a budget,
which shall be funded by the allocation of fees to public issuers based on their
relative share of equity market capitalization).
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of return to justify capital investment, while market-based
approaches may seek to determine the "value" of a service
by measuring the commercial value of comparable,
unregulated services in the marketplace. 279 Data vendors
have lamented the lack of such price analysis when
approving SRO rate schedules, noting that the Commission
merely compares the rates set by oligopolists against one
another, rather than requiring an independent basis for
approving such rates.28 0
The Commission has considered whether cost-plus
licensing is feasible in the context of market information.
While the Commission has stated that the price of market
data should be reasonably related to the cost of production
and has solicited comment on various approaches for
allocating costs to the production of data by exclusive
processors, it has not formally applied a cost-based
standard to proposed fee schedules. First, cost-plus
licensing would require greater transparency in the
finances of self-regulatory organizations, and decisions as to
which SRO services should be included in determining the
cost of producing market information, as opposed to
facilitating trades, supervising members, listing companies,
and all of the other SRO services from which SROs draw
income.281 Second, cost-plus licensing requires the SEC to
279. See generally Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to
Networks: Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885
(2003); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-46 (1998).
280. Petition for Commission Review of Exchange Act Release No. 54,597
(File No. SR-NYSEArca 2006-21), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
2006/netcoalitionpetitionlll406.pdf (seeking full Commission review of
NYSEArca rulemaking approved by delegated authority to the Division of
Market Regulation). In the petition, a coalition of internet data providers
sought reconsideration of a proposed fee schedule for NYSEArca limit order
book quotations because the Division failed to apply a cost-based standard, but
referred generally to the consistency of NYSEArca's classification of fees with
that of other exclusive processors, such as Nasdaq, the Options Price Reporting
Authority, the NYSE, and the CT and CQ Plans. Petitioner noted, inter alia,
that Archipelago had provided this information for free prior to its merger with
the NYSE.
281. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 9, at 2533-45. See generally The SEC's
Market Structure Proposal: Will It Enhance Competition?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005); Market Data Concept Release, 64 Fed. Reg.
70,613, at 70,629 (Dec. 17, 1999). The Commission has recently proposed rules
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approve the stratification of different classes of investors for
purposes of developing fee schedules. 28 2
Value-based approaches are even more difficult to
fathom. Rebates paid by exchanges and other market
centers to individual members and customers may provide
some evidence that market data fees are set too high.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to separate out whether such
rebates are designed to mitigate market data overcharges
or whether such rebates are a form of ex-post payment for
order flow. 28 3 The Commission has made attempts to
determine the proportionate "value" of one SRO's quotation
information versus another's based on the quality of such
information.28 4  Such approaches, however, entail
consideration of a number of variables-such as the market
capitalization and liquidity of the item being quoted or the
volume of trades, or the amount of time the market is
quoting at the inside quote-which a regulatory formula
can only crudely approximate. 28 5  Once enshrined in
to require greater separation between SROs' regulatory and operational
functions and to require internal controls to ensure that regulatory monies do
not subsidize operational activities. See Fair Administration and Governance of
Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg.
71,126 (Dec. 8, 2004) (proposed rules to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.6a-
5(n)(1), (4), 240.15Aa-3(n)(1), (4)).
282. See, e.g., Petition for Rulemaking, submitted by Andrew C. Wells,
Securities Industry Association, to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC (Apr. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-499.pdf (petitioning the
Commission to review the inconsistent definitions of "professional" and
"nonprofessional" investors for purposes of determining the terms on which
such persons may purchase market information).
283. SELIGMAN, supra note 22, at 397-416 (describing "give-up"
arrangements on stock exchanges as symptomatic of "higher-than-competitive-
level transaction costs" before the abolition of fixed commission schedules in
1975).
284. Cf. Reichman, supra note 9, at 2533-45. The Commission's proposal
was motivated, in part, by the gamesmanship involved in allocating revenues
by traditional formulae based on the number or volume of transactions.
Regulation NMS Proposing Release, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, at 11,179-80 (Mar. 9,
2004).
285. The formula for the allocation of market data revenues by SRO
exclusive processors under NMS Plans essentially allocates income first to
individual "eligible securities" reported under a Plan based on a relative
measure of total transaction volume ("security income allocation"), and then
distributes the security income allocation to individual Plan participants based
on the proportionate dollar volume of transaction reports reported by the
participant in such security (adjusted to minimize the impact of "qualified"
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national market system plans, moreover, further
amendments may be prolonged by dissenting parties who
have little interest in accommodating their competitors.
Compulsory licensing has other limitations, including
the difficulty of limiting the scope of information subject to
a Commission-established licensing regime. For example, in
the context of market information, the more pressure is
placed to make visible top-of-book data accessible, the more
incentive market centers have to render the top-of-book
information as valueless as possible, while creating more
content-laden, lesser-regulated categories of data. 286 Thus,
attempts to regulate the cost of market data run the risk of
eroding the value of the "core market data" that is subject
to compulsory licensing. On the other hand, an attempt to
regulate all market data would paralyze innovation in
market data products, if only because the Commission
would be called upon in each case to determine whether the
fees charged for each stratum of data are reasonable. 28 7
C. Nondiscriminatory Access
The Commission has also experimented with the
regulation of selective disclosure of information under the
rubric of fair and reasonable or nondiscriminatory access.
Recent scholarship has advocated the use of fair or
nondiscriminatory access requirements for the licensing of
intellectual property. 288 Under such approaches, regulators
would not oversee the rate-setting process but would be
entitled to intervene in any denial of licenses to individual
market participants on the basis of unfairly discriminatory
criteria. Thus, persons who have been discriminated
transactions over five thousand dollars) and the relative percentage of time the
participant published an automated quote equal to the national best bid and
offer (weighted by the dollar size of the quote) in such security. See Regulation
NMS Adopting Release, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, at 37,610 (June 2, 2005).
286. See supra note 52 (description of branded depth-of-book information
products).
287. Indeed, recent reform efforts have deregulated certain categories of
market information. As part of its Regulation NMS, the Commission eliminated
the prohibition against the display of an individual market center's last sale
data without an accompanying consolidated feed. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.601
(2006).




against might either have the right to appeal a denial of
access to a court or to the Commission, or would be able to
raise discriminatory denial as a defense in a subsequent
proceeding to enforce the owner's property right.
The virtue of such approaches is that they permit the
intellectual property owner to license the requested
intellectual property at a fee set by market forces, rather
than regulatory fiat. Enforcement, moreover, does not
require the same regulatory apparatus to determine cost of
inputs, as long as there are sufficient purchasers of an
owner's intellectual property to determine the appropriate
"value" of each configuration of property licensed.
Nondiscriminatory licensing requirements have, for
example, figured prominently in iterations of recent
database protection legislation. 28 9
The federal securities laws contain various provisions
conferring authority on the SEC to ensure fair access to
market services provided by SROs. These provisions were
designed to complement the requirement that all brokers
and dealers be members of an exchange or national
securities association. For example, denials of exchange
membership, other than on the basis of one of several
statutory criteria, are appealable to the Commission. The
Exchange Act also confers upon the Commission broad, if
little-used, authority to require the registration of
"securities information processors" and to hear appeals for
denial or limitation of services. Thus, the SEC's rules on the
sale of market data by exchanges and national securities
associations refer to "fair" and "nondiscriminatory"
standards for licensing.290
289. Initial drafts of the EU Database Directive required compulsory
licensing of databases held by "sole source" owners in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data, 50 VAND. L. REV. 49 (1997). Such
requirements were dropped in the final Directive. See Council Directive 1996/9,
1996 O.J. (L 77) (EC).
290. Under Commission rules, the distribution of market data must take
place on terms that are "not unreasonably discriminatory." The wholesale
distribution of market data in a national market system stock by the exclusive
processor for one or more SROs (or by a broker who is the exclusive source of
such information) to vendors and other SIPs, moreover, must be effected on
terms that are "fair and reasonable." 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a) (2006).
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The SEC has attempted to extend the idea of "fair
access" beyond the express provisions of its statutory
authority. For example, the SEC requires high-volume
"alternative trading systems" to establish written standards
for granting access to trading and to provide access to its
services by applying such standards in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner.291 The asserted statutory basis
for this rule was that, since such systems could be regulated
as exchanges, the SEC's greater power to impose the full
regulatory regime for exchange regulation includes the
lesser power to mandate fair access.
Extending a fair access requirement to other areas,
such other types of information or standards, would be
within the Commission's authority if the Commission has
greater authority to prohibit or limit the transactions or
products at issue.292 In areas where no such statutory
authority exists, however, the Commission would have to
pursue indirect rulemaking that would further attenuate its
authority. 293 It could be argued, for example, that index
providers are in effect securities information processors,
since the ongoing function they provide is to compute the
value of an index, and should be required to grant licenses
for the use of such information in a nondiscriminatory
manner. Alternatively, the Commission might attempt to
use its authority under Exchange Act § 19(c) or the Unlisted
Trading Privileges Act to prohibit any self-regulatory
organization from listing an index-based product unless the
index provider agrees to license use of its index to other
markets on similar terms.294
291. 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (2006); Regulation ATS Adopting Release, 63
Fed. Reg. 70,844, at 70,872-75 (Dec. 22, 1998).
292. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm (2000) (permitting the SEC to grant
exemptive relief for any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions,
from the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts).
293. In Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the D.C. Circuit
expressed doubt that, when a statutory term is "susceptible of several
meanings, as many terms are," it follows that "Congress has authorized an
agency to choose any one of those meanings" without reference to the context in
which the term is used. Id. at 878. The D.C. Circuit's logic may call into
question such selective reinterpretation of statutory terms in order to assert
such authority selectively over new classes of market participant.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 781(f)(1)(D)-(E) (2000) (requiring the Commission to
consider, when extending unlisted trading privileges to any security, to take
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In particular, as securities are increasingly cross-listed
abroad, and hardwired linkages become concomitantly
difficult to mandate by regulation, fair access requirements
might serve as a better approach to data dissemination.
For example, commentators have considered whether, in
lieu of consolidating quotation and transaction information
through the "exclusive processors" of one or more SROs, 295
individual market centers could be relied upon to provide
fair access to competing data consolidators, who could then
disseminate a consolidated best bid and offer or last sale
data to end-users. 296 Some discrimination among end-users
might be inevitable-for example, due to creditworthiness,
prior contractual breaches, or other misbehavior-but these
are recognized grounds for exclusion from existing fair
access rules.297 The presence of competition and threat of
antitrust enforcement may, in any event, be more
persuasive than the threat of reprimands or fines resulting
from Commission enforcement. 298
into account "the desirability of removing impediments to and the progress that
has been made toward the development of a national market system").
295. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e) (2000) (membership in national securities
exchanges limited to registered broker-dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(b) (2000)
(imposing different registration requirements on "exclusive" and non-"exclusive"
SIPs).
296. The Commission wishes investors to have a uniform "NBBO"
representing all market centers to ensure that execution opportunities are
simultaneously disclosed to professional market participants and investors. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text. While individual data vendors or end-
users can compile such resources by collecting information from different
suppliers, the Commission has expressed concern that not all investors will
have identical information if time lags, transmission errors, or unsynchronized
clocks result in different computations of the NBBO or last sale data. See
generally SEC, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MARKET INFORMATION: A
BLUEPRINT FOR RESPONSIBLE CHANGE (2001), available at
http'/www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/finalreport.htm.
297. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000);
see also Rule 301(b)(5) of Regulation ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (2006);
Regulation ATS Adopting Release, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, at 70,872-75 (Dec. 22,
1998)..
298. Although the Commission has the power to suspend or revoke the
registration of an SRO under § 19(h) of the Exchange Act, Commission
sanctions against SROs for failure to enforce securities laws typically involve
censure, fines, and injunctive relief. For example, see administrative
proceedings against stock exchanges in 2005-2006: In re PHLX, Exchange Act
Release No. 53,919 (June 1, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad
minI2006/34-53919.pdf; In re NYSE, Exchange Act Release No. 51,524 (Apr. 12,
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If, on the other hand, intermediation is mandated for
regulatory purposes, the Commission could ensure that
mandatory intermediation does not lead to abuses of
market power by eliminating conflicts of interest that might
lead to discriminatory denials of access. For example, an
exchange that both serves as primary market for a security
and controls the primary information processor for its listed
securities has significant power to set fees in ways that
discourage competition by rival market centers or data
providers.299 Rival market centers may balk, for example, at
providing their data to such an "exclusive processor"
controlled by a competitor, even if its compensation is set by
a Commission formula, to the extent that the exclusive
processor may control the format and terms of the
transmission. Similarly, rival data vendors may seek to
purchase raw data from exclusive processors at wholesale
prices, even as such exclusive processors have retail
distribution networks of their own.300 Restricting vertical
integration of market centers, data consolidators, and
wholesale and retail information vendors might allay these
concerns.
D. Timing of Regulatory Approvals
Temporally limited monopolies are perhaps the key tool
used to balance private incentives and public access in
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51524.pdf; In re Nat'l
Stock Exch. et al., Exchange Act Release No. 51,714 (May 19, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-51714.pdf; In re Nat'l Ass'n Sec.
Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,538 (Aug. 8, 1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3437538.txt (imposing remedial sanctions).
299. For example, the Commission required Nasdaq to open bidding for a
new exclusive securities information processor for Nasdaq-listed securities to
satisfy concerns of rival trading systems that were required to provide access to
their quotes equivalent to access via Nasdaq or another SRO. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,020, at 8,021-22 (Jan. 26,
2001).
300. In re Bunker Ramo Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-15,372, 1978
WL 171128 (Nov. 29, 1978); Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 801 F.2d 1415
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Domestic Secs. v. Instinet Corp., 1998 WL 1178670 (Nat'l Ass'n
Sec. Dealers Arbitration Award) (Sept. 9, 1998); see also LEE, supra note 53, at
171-77; Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1997) (describing the
marginal cost problem and the merits of price discrimination).
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intellectual property law. While information must be
shared to be commercially valuable, often the lead time
necessary to extract value from the information will be
significantly less than the time necessary for the
information to become widely available. 3 1 National market
system plans, for example, release information about
quotations and transactions to the public domain within
fifteen to twenty minutes, which appears for most equity
securities to be sufficient time for the trading value of such
information to dissipate.3 02 In such cases, intervention may
be necessary to require disclosure more promptly if
regulatory policy is to limit intellectual property rights.
By contrast, when the necessary lead time to recoup an
investment is significantly longer than the time within
which information is likely to become publicly available,
regulatory intervention is necessary to preserve the value of
proprietary rights. As with copyright and patent regimes, it
has frequently been suggested that statutory periods of
time be established for information products that fall short
of existing intellectual property regimes, either to recover
research and development costs or to establish dominant
market share before they are appropriated by
competitors. 30 3 For yet other types of information, such as
indices and standards, ongoing protection might be
necessary to justify continued effort to "maintain" the
information product.
To a certain degree, regulated markets are at a
significant disadvantage to other market participants when
developing new information products. Any substantively
new exchange rules, policies, facilities, or derivative
products must undergo public notice and comment, which
301. Reichman, supra note 9, at 2547.
302. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (Regulation NMS rule suggesting that the
quality of a market center's price discovery may be determined, in part, by the
average spread realized within five minutes of a transaction); see also Nat'l
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual: Rule 6230 (CCH 2006), available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=l189&recordid=115
9007287&elementid=1159006397&highlight=6230#r 159007287 (establishing
15-minute window for reporting transactions in registered corporate debt
securities).
303. See Reichman, supra note 9, at 2438-42; Lunney, supra note 11, at 596-
98 (discussing the underproduction of easily copied works).
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gives competitors advance notice. 30 4 Even with expedited
review for some products, 30 5 the lag time between
announcement and implementation may be critical to a
product's success. By contrast, when non-SRO market
participants seek consultation with or approval from
regulatory personnel with respect to new products, they
often seek informal relief, which itself may often be kept
confidential for a period of time to preserve the requesting
party's competitive edge. 30 6
Historically, one regulatory technique to preserve some
value for intellectual property in the absence of express
statutory authority has been to delay regulatory approvals
for rival products that are substantially identical to a new
product. 307 The CFTC, for example, has historically viewed
such objectives as a necessary consideration in its oversight
of futures markets. 308 By contrast, the SEC has taken the
position that rival exchanges may copycat certain rule
changes on an expedited basis. Even if rival developers of
financial products may be required to seek Commission
approval (for example, if the original no-action relief is
confined to the description of the creator's product), some
competitors may be willing to gamble that the agency will
not take a contradictory position if relief is sought very
shortly before rollout, if at all.
Commission inaction in the face of product allocation
arrangements may likewise be viewed, more benignly, as an
attempt to allow market participants to recoup the costs of
product development through a temporary monopoly. The
Commission's willingness to tolerate delays in the
commencement of multiple trading despite orders
304. 15 U.S.C. § 19(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2006) (defining the
term "proposed rule change").
305. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.19b-5, 240.19b-4(e) (2006) (fast-tracking of rule
changes for derivative products for which adequate standards and surveillance
agreements exist).
306. See generally Procedures Applicable to Requests for No-Action and
Interpretive Letters, Exchange Act Release No. 6,269, 45 Fed. Reg. 81,917 (Dec.
12, 1980) (describing procedures for the submission of confidential requests for
no-action and interpretive letters).
307. Ronald W. Anderson, The Regulation of Futures Contract Innovations
in the United States, 4 J. FUT. MARKETS 297 (1984); Mulherin, Netter &
Overdahl, supra note 12, at 595-625; supra note 106.
308. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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permitting or requiring competitive trading of such
products 30 9 may in some respects be explained as sympathy
for such arrangements. Such relief, however, is problematic
because of its unpredictability, and may be justified more
by the Commission's relative appetite for taking
enforcement action against certain market participants
rather than an economic analysis of the costs of product
development. In parallel circumstances, for example, the
Commission has aggressively sought to squelch exclusivity
arrangements among market participants even where no
anticompetitive behavior may exist. 310
IV. A REGULATORY AGENDA
Critics of the SEC frequently lament the agency's
failure to articulate principles for securities disclosure and
regulation. To be fair, many of the alternative regulatory
regimes favored by such commentators would require the
Commission substantially to scale back its oversight of
securities markets in a manner inconsistent with its
legislative mandate to further "the protection of investors
and the public interest." As such, the Commission's
deregulatory efforts have been modest in ambition and
incremental in scope, such as reforms of the public offering
process and the dismantling of the more anticompetitive
exchange rules held over from before the federal securities
laws.
At the same time, the Commission is aware that
greater deregulation will be necessary as a result of
structural changes. The combined impact of
demutualization and globalization of markets will require
greater reliance on comity and less reliance on domestic
rulemaking to achieve regulatory goals. As of 2006, the two
largest U.S. stock exchanges by volume and number of
listings-the NYSE and the Nasdaq Stock Market-have
both become publicly held, for-profit corporations. Industry
associations have raised concerns about the continuing
vitality of a self-regulatory system in which broker-dealers
309. See Competitive Developments in the Options Markets, Exchange Act
Release No. 49,175, 69 Fed. Reg. 6,124, at 6,125 (Feb. 9, 2004).
310. See Steven Vames, SEC's BrokerTec Probe Puts a Model to the Test,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at C15.
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are regulated by potential competitors, and SROs
themselves have conceded that the current system of
securities market oversight is inadequate. 311
Meanwhile, NYSE has merged with Euronext, N.V.,
and both NYSE-Euronext and Nasdaq are considering
further mergers with other international exchange holding
companies. 312 Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have
maintained that domestic securities regulation will not pose
an obstacle to consummation of such mergers, even as the
prospect of greater cross-listing, trading, and eventually
clearance and settlement will further draw into focus
disparities between the respective regulatory regimes. 313
While the SEC has acceded to, or at least considered the
possibility of, recognizing the adequacy of foreign securities
regulation, 314 the significant volume of trading in U.S.
securities overseas 31 5 and anecdotal evidence respecting the
reduction of cross-listings by foreign companies following
311. See Comments on Exchange Act Release No. 50,700 (Concept Release
Concerning Self-Regulation) (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.sec.govl
rules/concept/s74004.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
312. See Fleckner, supra note 6, at 2559 (describing the NYSE merger with
Archipelago Holdings and Nasdaq's acquisition of Instinet); Roberta S. Karmel,
The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global
Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=958260; Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons,
NYSE Group Reaches Deal To Acquire Euronext, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2006, at
C3; James Kanter & Heather Timmons, Nasdaq Raises Its Stake In London
Stock Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at C6.
313. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Fact Sheet on Potential Cross-Border
Exchange Mergers (June 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006/2006-96.htm.
314. On March 1, 2007, Erik R. Sirri, Director of the SEC's Division of
Market Regulation, revived discussion of proposals to exempt foreign exchanges
from U.S. registration subject to conditions established by rule. Erik R. Sirri,
Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation, Trading Foreign Shares, (March 1,
2007), available at httpJ/www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch03OlO7ers.htm; see also
Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed. Reg.
30,485, pt. VII.B.1 (June 4, 1997) (soliciting comment on a proposal to rely on
home-country regulation of non-U.S. securities exchanges).
315. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n (SIFMA), Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Fact Book Global Addendum 2006, SIFMA RES. REP., Nov.
2006, at 57-58, available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/RRVoll-2.pdf
(reporting $4.495 trillion in gross purchases and $121.585 billion in net
purchases of foreign equity securities by U.S. investors of foreign stocks).
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Sarbanes-Oxley 316 suggest that such efforts have been
insufficient to staunch investor demand.
These developments suggest that, where possible, the
Commission should consider greater reliance upon private
incentives (through proprietary rules), while using
rulemaking judiciously to address situations in which
traditional conflicts of interest or fraud come into place.
With the erosion of formal distinctions among market
centers-SRO and non-SRO-and market participants-
dealers and institutional traders-the Commission will
need to develop better approaches to encourage the
development of robust corporate and market information,
such as those inherent in the proprietary claims that exist
under intellectual property law. It may also be easier to
export rules grounded in universal norms of ownership and
authorial integrity, rather than a set of regulations geared
exclusively to a single set of market institutions. 317
A. Acknowledge Proprietary Claims
A preliminary step would be for the Commission to
acknowledge that the rights of information owners under
state law are not preempted except as expressly provided by
statute or Commission regulations. The Commission's
mixed signals as to the proprietary rights of creators have
316. See Stephen Labaton, Treasury Chief Urges 'Balance' in Regulation of
U.S. Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at C1 (comments of Treasury
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.).
317. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (1999) (suggesting that property-
type rules are dominant in international law because of the costs of developing
an institutional apparatus to enforce liability-type rules); Lao, supra note 16, at
1676; see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903 (1998); Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International
Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J.
INT'L. L. 563 (1998). But see Jeffrey E. Garten, Self-Regulation in the Global
Context, 2000 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 23 (arguing for centralization of self-
regulatory powers to deal with regulatory problems posed by globalization). The
increasingly transjurisdictional nature of regulatory enforcement requires
greater emphasis on information sharing and reliance on the cooperation of
complementary regulators in other jurisdictions. Cf. Joel Klein & Preeta Bansal,
International Antitrust Enforcement in the Computer Industry, 41 VILL. L. REV.
173 (1996) (discussing the relative merits of information sharing, positive
comity and unilateral enforcement of U.S. antitrust law).
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led market participants to argue, as in Archipelago, that
the preemptive scope of the federal securities laws reach
further. Clarifying that Commission rules derogate from
such common law rights, rather than supplant them, is a
first step toward creating incentives for market participants
to bargain for licenses.
Where proprietary claims under state law are in
doubt-such as claims over the use of indices and the
design of financial products-the Commission should
consider using its regulatory authority to provide greater
protection (or at a minimum, legal certainty). Listing of
index-based products, for example, could be conditioned
upon obtaining a license from the relevant index provider;
such a requirement could be justified on investor protection
concerns by a desire to ensure that index providers have the
ability to exercise some control over the use of their work
product.
B. Permit Greater Nondiscriminatory Selectivity in
Disclosure or Licensing
To the extent that some ability to exclude is required to
preserve the value of information, absent independent
judicial or regulatory valuation, Congress may wish to give
the Commission greater authority to permit selective
licensing or disclosure in appropriate circumstances.
Permitting creators of information to provide selective
access to various categories of information defined by safe
harbors, subject to Commission review, may be one way to
address this issue. Just as the Commission recognizes the
importance of intermediaries in the context of market
information and order execution, recognition might be given
to the role of analysts and institutional shareholders in the
dissemination of corporate information. While it may be
inappropriate to discriminate within such categories,
permitting selective disclosures to all similarly situated
analysts or shareholders on a nondiscriminatory basis could
encourage the flow of information to markets while
mitigating harmful asymmetries of information.
Where certain categories of information contribute to
the formation of "downstream" information (such as the
contribution of company information to market prices or the
contribution of market prices to index prices), the
Commission should consider whether conflict-of-interest
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rules, rather than rate regulation, might help to address
issues of fair access. In the few, if any, situations in which
access to a particular market center or data provider is
considered "essential," it may make sense to adopt
Commission rules that prohibit vertical integration of the
"essential" information with downstream users (e.g.,
indices) or intermediaries (such as data vendors) in order to
eliminate conflicts of interest that might result in the
limitation of downstream uses. Otherwise, privately
adopted limitations on information or other goods that are
"inputs" for subsequent processes are best left to antitrust
law.318
More generally, the Commission should reconsider the
respective roles of securities and antitrust law in policing
access. There are many areas of securities regulation where
the Commission rightly believes regulatory oversight of
restraints on trade is preferable to antitrust enforcement or
litigation, such as the conduct of syndicated offerings and
governance of traditional non-profit exchanges, where
"coordinated" industry action is still practically necessary to
achieve regulatory objectives. Where such coordination is no
longer required due to erosion of market power, it is
debatable whether ex ante Commission rulemaking or rule
approvals are clearly superior to ex post antitrust
enforcement. Antitrust regulators have considerable
experience with pricing and intellectual property licensing
agreements in multiple industries, while Commission
personnel are, by definition, limited in focus to a single
industry. 319 Moreover, the conflicts posed by vertical
arrangements-which typically involve SROs or other
dominant market centers-may well be more effectively
policed under antitrust law, given the significant risk of
regulatory capture. 320
318. See Kieff & Paredes, supra note 13, at 190-93.
319. Cf. BREYER, supra note 128, at 156-83, 197-219 (discussing relative
benefits of antitrust enforcement and regulatory supervision); Kieff & Paredes,
supra note 13, at 199 (suggesting that "courts generally should enforce
restrictive licenses involving [intellectual property] as long as they are
enforceable under contract law and do not run afoul of the antitrust laws").
320. See supra note 133.
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C. Reconsider Investor-Negotiated Disclosure for Certain
Information
The Commission should also endeavor to encourage
licensing or disclosure of information though negotiated
bargaining, and concomitantly to undo regulatory
structures that misalign creative effort and revenues. Even
in situations where it is difficult to identify the social value
of information, it may be preferable to achieve the
appropriate equilibrium through ongoing negotiation
between producers and principal consumers, rather than to
proceed by isolated multilateral rulemaking exercises which
are reviewed sporadically, if at all. Standard setting
organizations may also be used as a proxy for end-users
when bargaining costs with principal consumers would be
excessive. Bargaining may, as today, be backstopped by the
Commission's enforcement power or by default rules, as
discussed further below.
The licensing of market information, for example, is
likely to take place among a relatively well-informed
community of market participants and is therefore an ideal
candidate for a bargaining framework. Unlike current
national market system plans, which are limited to SROs
by SEC rule, 321 mechanisms for the collection and sale of
market information to wholesale data vendors could be
adopted through a representative sampling of all reporting
market centers. End-users should also be able to shop for
data, paying more for higher-quality data and less for
lower-quality data,322 to force market centers to improve the
quality (and not merely quantity) of price discovery that
takes place through their systems-rather than pay a
321. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 11A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(3)
(2000).
322. Consider, for example, the NASD's proposal to require separate
identifiers for "dealer-to- dealer" transactions and "dealer-to-customer"
transactions in corporate debt securities reported through TRACE. NASD,
Notice to Members 06-22 (May 2006), available at http://www.nasd.com/Rules
Regulation/NoticestoMembers/2006NoticestoMembers/NASDW_016574. The
former data may be considered significantly more valuable than the latter
because of the active bargaining that is presumed to take place between market
professionals. One could envision similar designations in equity markets
distinguishing transactions among market makers, transactions resulting from
the crossing of customer limit orders, and internalized transactions resulting
from the execution of market orders.
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uniform price that ostensibly funds self-regulation
generally.
In the context of public company disclosure, devices
that might formerly have been used to encourage
negotiated disclosure between issuers and shareholders,
such as listing agreements and corporate codes, have fallen
by the wayside as competition for listings has intensified
and securities offerings have taken place on a national (and
international) scale. 323 In their place, however, have
emerged private standard-setting organizations or rating
agencies that perform similar functions. 324 To the extent
that there are significant benefits to being included in a
higher exchange tier or as an index component, changes in
such eligibility determinations can often have a significant
impact on corporate disclosure or accounting practices
without regulatory action. 325 Greater reliance on such
intermediaries to oversee certain aspects of financial
reporting or corporate governance might ease the burden of
mandatory rules.
It has also been frequently suggested that issuers be
permitted to opt out of particular disclosure rules-
conditioned on compliance with such standards-with the
periodic approval of a majority of public shareholders for
disclosure items where the cost of compliance is high and
the cost-benefit ratio of disclosure is difficult to assess.326
For example, issuers may ask disinterested shareholders to
vote, on an annual basis, to opt out of particular auditing
standards or internal financial and non-financial disclosure
control requirements. 327 Alternatively, the Commission
323. See Palmiter, supra note 29, at 2-3.
324. See Cunningham, supra note 110, at 294.
325. See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low, S&P Sheds Light On Accounting For
Pension Costs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2002, at C1 (describing the impact of S&P's
decision to use actual returns as opposed to expected returns in calculating
pension costs); Howard Silverblatt, Option Expensing: The Time Is at Hand,
Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.businessweek.comlinvestor/con
tent/nov2005/pi20051122-3318_piOl5.htm (describing the impact of S&P's
decision to expense options in earnings estimates).
326. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 25, at 1595-97.
327. In other contexts, the Commission and SROs have entertained
shareholder initiatives to change corporate governance practices-such as
shareholder nominations or executive pay-as a means of encouraging
shareholder participation in corporate governance. See, e.g., Security Holder
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could simply migrate to a "principles-based" system of
disclosure and grant safe harbors for compliance with rules
articulated by "recognized" national standard setters.
It might also be feasible to encourage providers of
accuracy enhancing information-such as rating agencies or
auditors-to enter into agreements for the sale of their
work product to end-users of such information. To the
extent that rating agencies and auditors rely exclusively on
fees from issuers, they experience a conflict of interest in
developing their initial assessments. Allowing them to sell
their work product (on nondiscriminatory terms, as
discussed below) or otherwise consult with shareholders or
other end-users independent of management could not only
reduce some of the financial conflicts, but also improve the
flow of information to the marketplace.
D. Delineate Scope of Information Rights and Protected
Uses
Managing the scope of proprietary claims is one method
by which the Commission could achieve its goal of
balancing the right to compete against the threats of free-
riding and proliferation. As discussed above, regulators may
prefer that trading activity be concentrated in a few, super-
regulated entities rather than spread across multiple
market participants. And yet, due to its obligation to
preserve competitive opportunities, the Commission must
leave open the regulatory possibility-if not probability-of
viable challengers.
One approach to addressing the issue would be to
permit branding of more quotation information. For
example, in the context of market information, market
makers are not only able, but encouraged, to siphon order
flow away from primary market centers by holding
themselves out as willing to trade at the primary market
center's quoted price. 328 To the extent that market data
Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784
(Oct. 23, 2003) (proposing Rule 14a-11); NYSE, Listed Company Manual,
303A.08, available at http://www.nyse.com/RegulationFrameset.html?nyseref
=http%3A//www.nyse.comaudiencelistedcompanies.html&displayPage=/about/
listed1022221393251.html (shareholder approval of equity compensation
plans).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 199-201.
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dissemination is controlled by licensing agreements that
could, in theory, prohibit a pattern of "matching" of the
owner's quotation, such restrictions could deter "unhealthy"
competition from cream-skimming market makers.
To ensure that healthy competition to primary market
centers-such as formulaic price improvement or
independent price discovery-is not deterred, "derivation"
of a quote from another market, but with minimum
improvement, might be viewed as sufficiently
"transformative" to avoid being perceived as infringement.
Meanwhile, a trading system that in fact attracts a
substantial number of customer orders would not be
perceived as infringing upon another market's quote, even if
their quotations occasionally matched. Of course, each
market center would be free to license its quote for
automatic execution-as many exchanges do today-on
specified terms as necessary to promote liquidity.
A similar case could be made for market indices, or
even financial products generally. The ability to assert
rights beyond the limited protection conferred by
trademark law could give index providers greater comfort
that the fruits of their work product will not be siphoned off
by competing providers absent a licensing agreement. In
particular, to the extent that many index-based products
today tinker with the weighting and stock-selection
components of such indices,329 the need to ensure that index
providers have some control over the direct and derivative
uses of their products-if only to monitor usage and require
express disclaimers of liability-may be desirable.330
One way to implement this approach would be to
require new indices or financial products either to
demonstrate no substantial overlap with comparable
instruments or to obtain a license from the prior index.331
329. See, e.g., John C. Bogle & Burton G. Malkiel, Turn on a Paradigm?,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2006, at A14.
330. Tom Lauricella & Diya Gullapalli, Not All Index ETFs Are What They
Seem to Be, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2006, at C1 (describing active management
strategies-and the risks created thereby-used by some ostensibly index-based
exchange traded funds).
331. The investor protection concerns justifying such a rule would be
substantially similar to those justifying the requirement that the SEC approve
the soundness of an index prior to listing a derivative product thereon. See
supra note 83.
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Exceptions might be made if the range of eligible
component securities in a particular securities industry
classification is small enough that the "idea" of a sector-
index merges with its implementation. 332 A more restrictive
approach might add a requirement that indices licensed for
use in connection with listed financial products be subject to
multiple licensing on nondiscriminatory terms, so that
competing markets have less incentive to test the
boundaries of comparability.
E. Promote Creation of Competitive Information Goods
If the Commission were to consider such mechanisms
for broadening the rights of existing market participants, it
would also have to ensure that there is a real opportunity
for the development of substitute goods. Thus, regulations
or regulatory policies that have the effect of inhibiting
investor choice must be relaxed so that more information
goods have an opportunity to find a niche in the
marketplace. At a minimum, the Commission should
consider revising rules that refer to specific information
products to permit uses of all comparable products unless
an exclusive standard is intended.333 For example, trade-
through rules may constrain the decisionmaking of broker-
dealers routing orders by favoring primary exchanges at the
expense of encouraging the development of competing
markets. These might, as the Commission had alternatively
considered, be replaced by rules that free broker choice but
require post-trade reporting of execution quality on a trade-
by-trade basis.
In the area of indices and product design, greater
opportunities for substitute goods may be created by
relaxing rules that require specific offsetting of products.
The Commission has largely relaxed such requirements for
broker-dealer net capital purposes, by permitting more
favorable net capital treatment for offsetting long and short
positions in different index options that fall into one of
several portfolio types. 334 Similarly, the Commission, with
332. See supra note 68.
333. See supra note 240.
334. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-la(a)(6) to -la(b)(1)(ii) (2006) (identifying index
"product groups" including "high-capitalized diversified market index options,"
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the encouragement of the Federal Reserve Board, has
explored the possibility of permitting customers to reduce
minimum margin requirements for their accounts based on
the risk inherent in a "portfolio" of securities, rather than
matching individual offsetting products or underlying
indices. 335
CONCLUSION
The Commission's role in regulating information is one
that has arguably been thrust upon it with little legislative
guidance and buffeted with considerable political pressure
over the past seven decades. Yet the Commission has
dutifully explored ways to balance the interests of
producers and consumers of information that will result in
more efficient markets. A core statement of principles-
such as those suggested herein-together with concrete
efforts to experiment and to collaborate with emerging
market participants, may go a long way toward clarifying
expectations and encouraging the development of new
information products.
"non-high-capitalization diversified market index options" and "narrow-based
index options" for purposes of determining offsets among index options). Thus,
for example, a broker-dealer might be permitted, under this rule, to use ninety
percent of the gain on a long Wilshire 5000 index option to offset the loss on a
short Russell 2000 index option. § 240.15c3-1a(b)(v)(B)(2)(i).
335. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.1(b)(3)(i) (2006).
20071

